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ABSTRACT
The (hi)stories of international law have strengthened the tentacles of coloniality in the legal
regime as they continue to taunt the precarious lifeworlds of people, our planet and social
imaginaries of an otherwise. The flow of coloniality has similarly rematerialized in decolonial
legal theories and the postcolonial historiographical accounts of international law. I intend to
demonstrate this colonial revival in the groundbreaking text of Antony Anghie Imperialism,
Sovereignty and the Creation of International Law (2005) which challenged the (hi)stories of
traditional jurisprudence. The latter was not necessarily a rejection nor negation of Western
thought, because I argue that postcolonial historiography and decolonial legal theory, in
general, have equally returned to multiple temporal and spatial concepts developed in the
intellectual colonial habitus and took a recourse to early-European doctrines and ushered in
modern modes of thinking. The general purpose of this dissertation is to identify the colonial
ontologies in temporal and spatial structures embedded in the legal decolonial discourse in
order to recognize the serious limitations of the current critical legal theories that have come
to function at the heart of the legal progress theology and the ever-becoming coloniality of law
as it is situated in the ethnographic sensorium (João Biehl & Peter Locke, 2017) of our social
dimension. Throughout my writing I identify the inability to delink from colonial ontologies in
critical legal theory as “the apostrophic impasse” and subsequently opt for different ways of
reading into this term to become sensible and legible subjects under the chassis of international
law.

KEY WORDS: Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), Colonialism, Public
International Law, Legal History, Historiography, Postcolonial Theory, Decoloniality, Critical
Social Theory, Temporality, Border-Thinking.
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APOSTROPHIC

[adjective] / ăpɒstrəfik / ā’p - os -trof - fik
Pertaining to the rhetoric use of, or using, apostrophe (sudden, exclamatory dialogue).
Apostrophe is an exclamatory figure of speech. It occurs when a speaker breaks off from
addressing the audience and directs speech to a third party such as an opposing litigant or
some other individual, sometimes absent from the scene. Often the addressee is a personified
abstract quality or inanimate object.
[C17: from Late Latin, from Greek apostrophos mark of elision, from apostrephein to turn away :
apo-, apo- + strephein, to turn; see streb(h)- in Indo-European roots.]
American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2016 by
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
Publishing Company. All rights reserved.

IMPASSE
[singular noun] /im’pæs / i m - p a s s e
a situation in which progress is blocked; an insurmountable difficulty; stalemate; deadlock
Collins English Dictionary. Copyright © HarperCollins Publishers

1. a passage open only at one end; blind alley
2. a situation offering no escape, as a difficulty without solution,

an argument where no agreement is possible, etc.
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 4th Edition. Copyright © 2010 by Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt. All rights reserved.
[C1850–55; ‹ F, equiv. to im- im-2 + -passe, s. of passer to pass]
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《PREFACE 》
As the locks of my hair decided to eagerly flirt with the aroma of the summer
zephyr busting through the taxi windows, my gaze began to be drawn to the ocean of
commercial boards covering Cairo’s newest desert city in the making - el-Qāhera elGedīda. Each billboard was inviting fresh prey of futuric capitalism to invest their life
savings in exchange for a huge amount of debt and mortal monetary enslavement in the
form of a “home”. This time, the calls of the sea seem to be coming from the piranhas of
global capitalism whose waves did not appear to be coming to us in bidding calm or vast
motions, but rather we find ourselves confronted with merciless rogue swells. From the
taxi ashore, the swells seemed to be waiting with baited breath to swallow any individual
resistance as no space along the Egyptian metropolis’ ring road was left uncovered or

deprived from the absence of signs of what modern prosperity should entail - at least on
a billboard. One notable piranha aimed to persuade its victims to get their feet wet with
the mantra that passive aggressively read ‘limited offer in life’. This predator of Emaar
Misr was offering fountainside residences with a ‘personalized payment plan’ in Uptown
Cairo. At the minimum, from such pied-á-terre one can imagine their future in this
modern realm, at an accelerated pace in these rapidly constructed cities filled with new
ideas of indifference wíth a synthetic fountain view. As I was merely gazing outside to

escape the stronghold that this underlying dissertation was increasingly gaining on my
entire line of thoughts, this particular mantra engulfed right into the part of my inner
monologue where I sensed that it would be scrutinized by my own theoretical
overthinking mechanisms. After which it would be left susceptible to further conversion
into its meaning in the social-legal world. A world that has been nestling itself in my
head since my first encounter with law school and subsequent love affair with critical
theories on the side. I accompanied this mantra to walk back with me into the doors of

my thoughts, by wondering if there was anything in life that does not have a limited offer.
Under the monopoly of the capital oligarchs, the hard/soft powers of imperialism, the
sweeping socio-infrastructure of modernity, the deadlock of patriarchies and the never
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ending reign of colonialism/coloniality, awaits nothing but deceptive offers, abiding
limitations and a life without living. As their convoys are escorting every movement of
our being and their oiled machinery are competing to build high-rise walls that prevent
us from being outside of heavily gated and constructed lifeworlds; the twenty-first
century of our existence is nothing bút a limited offer in life. That is, said the lawyer in

me, if one even dares to argue that it is an offer at all. An offer entails a certain form of
freedom or individual autonomy prevailing over outside forces in order to amend the
submission, bid, argue and eventually be left with the ability to partially/fully accept or
decline it, destitute from external violence, threats or other forms of coercion.

Life under the current regimes of the postmodern is indeed ‘offered’ to us in
installments, but there awaits no lakeview residence after our payment. Rather, the

madness of our lived realities are revealed to us in installments under the strict
supervision of the different chaperons of control. They smoothly guide us from one
oppressive force field in their old boys’ network into the next. As we are tossed around
between cyclical rendezvous with the stern entourage of the Global World Order, our
existence is violently shaped to their likings until we have become nothing but muzzled,
subjugated objects of their pleasure. Our bodies are intimately consumed, violated and
contaminated differently under the night sky of a million compelling eyes of the gents,

their chaperons and the gatekeepers. All work closely together in this pyramid scheme
as they unleash the installments of modernity/coloniality/capitalism/patriarchy 1 unto
us. As a vessel of this disposable life caught in the dungeons of the scheme of the
pyramid, these installments ensure the colonization of our entire existence. We are given
life on the preludes of death’s door each passing day and are placed in the vacuum of les
moribonds. Living in a perpetual state of moribund proliferates our death before we die;
1

The combination of modernity/capitalism/patriarchy/coloniality reminds us that different structures of power are
intertwined, interconnected and systemic modes of control. The slash (/) in the arrangement of the tetrad indicates that
these relationships to and from power exist simultaneously and that these terms do not appear to be mere singular
power structures which operate in separate aspects of life and/or living. The ‘/’ also specifies that these mechanisms
do function in their own particular manner and one cannot constitute the other. See also Walter D. Mignolo &
Catherine E. Walsh Supra note 22. At 139-140; See also Arturo Escobar, Beyond the Third World: imperial globality,
global coloniality, and anti-globalization social movements, 25 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY (2004).

2

meaning that a state of living is excluded for as long as we are submerged within the
tyrannies of postmodern material truths. The vast grips of the endless ocean of
oppressive forces kneaded us into forced labor and death-living by legal heirs of the
nation-state, multinational corporations, the abyssal line,2 institutionalized modernity,
the Colonial Matrix of Power,

3

speciesism, social emancipation, progress- and

development-thinking, the binaries of Man, identity politics, forced universalisms,
Enlightenment knowledge/reasoning and exclusionary social categories, but a “home”
we do not receive. Forced is our labor, but not merely in the sense of any Marxist
dialectics or unraveling methodologies of class divisions, but rather the labor of living
without a wage of working fór and ín the everyday. The heavy blanket of the exploitation
of human life covers all areas of livelihood, including the Earth on which we reside and
her fruits through which we are sustained physically, emotionally, mentally and

spiritually. The need to live life at a slower pace in order to provide a stream of water to
the seeds of deep, intimate conversations with others on the profound need to pour
different, alternative worlds over the map of our globe gets lost in the constant state of
emergency that we find ourselves in. As our bodies are wrapped in precarity and clothed
with long ánd short term urgency, the naked truth is hidden behind the veil of
consignments that we bestow unto others. The offers are even limited when we try to
make some general sense of the phenomena in the realities of our everyday lives through
2

The “abyssal line” is a term coined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) which encompasses a particular way of
modern Western thinking to divide knowledge, understanding and thinking from and about social realities as if they
were divided by a line with two realms on both sides. “The division is such that "the other side of the line" vanishes
as reality, becomes nonexistent, and is indeed produced as nonexistent. Nonexistent means not existing in any relevant
or comprehensible way of being. Whatever is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded because it lies beyond the
realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considers to be its other. What most fundamentally characterizes
abyssal thinking is thus the impossibility of the copresence of the two sides of the line. To the extent that it prevails,
this side of the line only prevails by exhausting it is only nonexist”. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Abyssal
Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges, 30 REVIEW (FERNAND BRAUDEL CENTER) 1 (2007),
45-46.
3 The “Colonial Matrix of Power” is a concept developed in the 1990s by Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano which
has subsequently been further developed by other critical theorists thereafter. The matrix as designed by Quijano
describes practices and legacies of European colonialism and its succeeding control over different domains
(economics, gender, authority, subjectivity and knowledge) and the ways in which it generally impedes on the
everydayness of life as a gradual absorption into our social orders. See Anibal Quijano, Coloniality of Power,
Eurocentrism and Latin America, 1 NEPLANTA 3 (2000a); Anibal Quijano, Colonialidad del poder y clasificacio ́n
social’, 1 JOURNAL OF WORLD SYSTEM RESEARCH 3 (2000b); See also Walter D. Mignolo, Coloniality of power
and de-colonial thinking, 21 CULTURAL STUDIES 2/3 (2007).
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critical theories, such as decolonial scholarship, Black feminist methodologies or
subaltern studies. Especially, if we for the most part have a tendency - or rather
unstoppable Pavlov reactionary urge - to intellectualize this pain the Global World Order
causes, use elitist academic jargon and actively let theories prevail over the praxis which
are refusing to inhabit shackles that force radical voices and deeds into invisibility and

illegibility. There is no escape clause or an option to default on the loans and the payment
we are supposed to make to the scheme of the pyramid’s business model consists of
becoming more and more intertwined by the colonization of ourselves and others.
During the unforeseen ruptures of the hegemonic tentacles we breathe, before it regains
its grip. But what happens in between, in the everydayness of our lives in which we do
not forge revolutions with capital ‘R’ or when liberal dichotomies are unable to capture
the complexity and fluidity of our unconformed being?

In the midst of this cyclone of pyramid schemes, piranhas and human urgency, I
often find nothing but the reigns of oppressive silence. As the winds of critical theories
dance around me without a clear invitation to a ball, the gala of organized resistance
seems like a line-storm of clouds in the skies forming a myriad of false expectations and
disillusion. Maybe it is the exact limited offer of critical theories, specifically in the post/ decolonial legal literature, that I am most frustrated with. Often decolonial legal

perspectives appear to me as one of the few paths which allow me to navigate through
the maze of the Modern world with a minimal sense of grounding or understanding of
the complexity in which bodies are forced to dwell. But these counter-narratives and the
alternative approaches to law are usually based on - or at least use - the colonial
constructs of time and space. The usage of these colonial concepts, in the end, result in
the reproduction and proliferation of the colonial (legal) system and, thus, do not offer a
segregated

leeway

out

Modernity/coloniality/capitalism/patriarchy

of

coloniality
continuously

captures,

at
archives

large.
and

quantifies subjects within their created spaces of colonial time and borders and have
redrawn our livelihoods into an abyss, an inferno, a forced residency within an oblivion

4

of colonial infinity. This demarcation in our lives as legalized subjects have mapped the
worlds into areas of the defined blank and void - nation states, linear borders,
geographical divisions, domesticated clock-time, past/present/future, time-based
productivity. The limitless offer in life through the mass-production of the one dimension
of time and two dimensionality of geographical space based on this colonial

epistemology of ordering human landscapes has also found its echo in post-/decolonial
legal literature. There is a need to critically engage with the works the postcolonial legal
theorists and/or Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars, who
are trying to escape from the gratification of the legal creation of time and space, but
‘the TWAIL-argument’ equally seems to reproduce the exact paradox through similar
quantification, spatiality and measurement. On the surface, the deconstruction of
categories of legal binaries might have seemed clear, but how do we understand the

relationship between different parts and times of the world after the so-called ‘post-colonial’
period? How does contemporary legal globalization beyond the modern demand that we
question the relationships of territories and temporalities to each other? Is the postcolonial
reformation - or annihilation - of time and space in everyday life by not also restructuring
time and space into modernization/progress/development/coloniality? The heterogeneity of
legal power produces certain relationships through the embodiment of historical
geography. Challenging the latter, thus, should be done with ‘situatedness’ and ‘three

dimensionality’. Or at least in a manner that does not Other specific subjects and/or
localities and does not indicate the zero dimensionality of normative descriptions of
space and place. Language and being made into a mere legal grammar, matters. Colonial
ordering is based on the primary notion of elimination and destruction of the Otherwise.
The Otherwise of civilizations, geographies, imaginations, natures, truths, jetzt Zeit, 4
spiritualities, knowledges and all that existed in the plural contrasting the singularity of

4

Walter Benjamin used ‘jetzt Zeit’ to contrast ‘homogeneous empty time’ in order to signify a specific temporal
epistemology that holds an opportunity for revolution or change as it is a particular conception of time that appeared
to be separate from the continuum of history. See Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in
ILLUMINATIONS (1940), 253-264.

5

coloniality. This dissertation is my Shikwa, 5 or my Complaint, against legal post/decolonial theories.

5

Shikwa (1909) and Jawab-e-Shikwa (1930), which is Urdu for “Complaint” / “Grievance” and “Response to
Complaint”, are two of the most famous poems written by the beloved philosopher, intellectual and lawyer
Muhammed Iqbal (later published in his book Kulliat-e-Iqbal (1936)). In Shikwa the poet raised a complaint against
Allāh  ﷻdue to Iqbal’s grievance on the deteriorating state of His servants on earth in reference to specific events in
Islamic history ranging from the collapse of the Ottoman and Mughal empires to colonization.

6

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
The terminologies that appear in the meadow of the colonial worlds consist of academic idioms that are
applied and interpreted in a variety of manners. Therefore the use of the terms “postcolonial(-ity/-ism)”
and “decolonial(-ity/-ism)” are deserving of their own revelation in the light and for the purpose of this
dissertation in order to overcome confusion as to their specific use in other fields, literature or areas of

expertise. In this text “colonialism” mostly serves as the antithesis of postcolonial(-ity/-ism), whereas
“coloniality” bears the opposite of decolonial(-ity/-ism). The postcolonial scripts of TWAIL scholarship
were in their first instance used to contemplate on the innate European ascendance, avail and utilization
of public international law. Therefore, in this dissertation the locution “postcolonial(-ity/-ism)”

specifically touches upon and signals the first periodical wave of critical scholarship as one that
predominantly referred to the so-called historical (post)colonial epoch of international law and later
colonial occurrences or tendencies, and in this manner, brought about a different reflection on the
subaltern relations to international law. I am aware that terminologies become fragile when they are
poached into defined figures of grammars and that they can be reclaimed to carry different messages
over time and space. It is certainly not a novel pinion in the wide field of critical social studies in which
“postcolonial(-ity/-ism)” also came to, lateron, signify diversities in awareness to the grounds on which
the current world order was established and how it ushered in peculiar relations to power over different
geographical and temporal patterns by approaches that ‘regard the postcolonial not as an epoch or age
but as a particular mode of historical emergence’.6 However, taking into consideration that this dissertation
hopes to primarily analyze limitations, it can simply not expand on the orthodox meaning of
“postcolonial(-ity/-ism)”. It may be apparent that the work of Antony Anghie, for example, is classified in
this provincial manner. I shall, instead, use the term “decolonial(-ity/-ism)” to refer to the critical
inauguration of the entire legal intellectual discourse that explored and explores legal avenues from the
margins of alterity, which then also includes Anghie’s text. The current ‘decolonial debate’ has been
situated largely around the critique of the limits in postcoloniality and my work is no different. How do
we then read the difference between “postcolonial(-ity/-ism)” and “decolonial(-ity/-ism)”? In a sense,
postcoloniality has been absorbed by the Modern as it did not necessarily decolonize ‘the nation-state’,
‘the law’ or ‘the legal subject’. The postcolonial has, in contrast to decoloniality, adapted to specific
modern constructs. This exact notion of modern absorption became a signifier in the decolonial critique

6

Keya Ganguly, Temporality and postcolonial Critique, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO POSTCOLONIAL

LITERARY STUDIES 162, 162 (Neil Lazarus et all., 2004).

7

to adress the limits of postcoloniality. In terms of international law specifically, the postcolonial critique
has been absorbed through the Westphalian system of the nation-state and the acquisition of Third World
sovereignty by former colonies. The colonial subject, thus, remained entrapped in the same system
regardless of a postcolonial approach. When I transition from using the term “postcolonial(-ity/-ism)” in
the first part of this dissertation to “decolonial(-ity/-ism)” in the following, it is an indication of this exact
decolonial critique of the specific postcolonial absorption by the Modern

and how coloniality

(re)appeared in the postcolonial decolonization movement. In my writing I tried to limit the
interchangeable use of “postcolonial(-ity/-ism)” and “decolonial(-ity/-ism)”, but when both terms are
combined it simply warrants a specific attention to the mechanics in the limits of postcoloniality/-ism
and the new distinct wave of decoloniality/-ism. Decoloniality/-ism ostensibly ushers in a completely
nouveau rhythm and time of decolonization and, in that sense, has distanced itself entirely from
postcoloniality/-ism.

As we find ourselves in the era of late-capitalism, my dissertation is saturated by non-

legal decolonial critical literature. It is built on the scaffold of temporal terms that many critical
scholars in social science and anthropology conceptualized, but it also finds itself in a particular
political moment in time. With a particular political moment I mean that there currently is a
certain tendency in academia, social theories and practices to call for the literal “decolonization
of everything”. But what does this mean and what implications does this have? The majority of
the literature that I am referring to throughout the text are used by me in an attempt to invite
different social critiques and temporal material in a conversation with the legal field of public
international law and the decolonial approach. It is a manner to further explore what this
political moment could mean. But it also takes into account that international law, in many ways,
is not just a discipline; it has also been established by the Modern as a field that is structured in
a very specific manner. Critical theories and its contemporary literature, in contrast, occur at

the edges of disciplinarity and not necessarily at the forefront of a discipline, such as
international law, that tries to capture subjects in a modern realm. Decolonial(-ity/-ism),
however, cannot be impoverished by descriptive linguistics as a component of language given
that it is not a transformative pathway with a revolting end point or movement set to one specific
outcome. Decoloniality is a sensibility that cannot be captured by othering moments or in
dialectics, but rather reveals what is not (yet) named. It almost functions with a poetic attitude

8

in which the ordinary meaning of words becomes fluid and melts through the hands of those
who tried to confine it. It might displease the reader that this note on terminology does not
include an endowed definition of “decolonial(-ity/-ism)” with rules or specificalities that ensure
the endurance of my words and the sectoral allocation thereof. It is the ambiguity surrounding
decoloniality that defies any conventional localization beyond normative decrees. Decolonial(-

ity/-ism) decoloniality is “a perspective, stance, and proposition of thought, analysis, sensing,
making, doing, feeling, and being that is actional (in the Fanonian sense), praxistical, and
continuing [..]It is in this sense that decoloniality can be understood as a process, practice, and
project of sowing seeds; of cultivating, nurturing, and growing, always vigilant of what the
Zapatistas refer to as the Storm brewing.’7

This dissertation makes use of postcolonial terminologies such as “the West”; “the Great

Powers”; “the Global North”; etc. vis-à-vis “the Third World”, “the colonies”, “the Global South”;
etc. However, I need to point out that this does not point to specific locations or geography.
Rather it is used in a manner to amplify a specific social demography and mode of thinking in
the (post)colonial and (post)modern era. These terms embody the central idea of the nationstate and they are not as geographically static or easily definable after the formal liberation of
the colonies and the ritual acquisition of sovereignty. “The West”, all its synonyms and antonyms
are imaginations. These imaginaries are the embodiment of specific modes of thinking and

power. I can, therefore, not quantify or give any geological meaning to these terms. The latter
would have been a postcolonial approach whereas decoloniality tries to further problematize
the simplification of these complex notions and terms. Historically, “the West” was about a
Cartesian moment and a hegemony of rationality which led to the constitution of the Modern.
The global adaptation of sovereignty and the universal becoming of nation-states means that
“the West” is appearing in more parts of the world than the literal West of the world. Anything
contrary to this would lead to a liberal reading of (de)coloniality/-ism (‘Europe colonizing the
South’). The decoloniality of power is, in contrast, positioned around the rationality of how the
Modern ‘makes sense’ of the world and its subjects. The West then does not merely emerge as
7

Walter D. Mignolo & Catherine E. Walsh Supra note 22. At 100.
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a particular geographical site, but rather as a particular logic and mode of thinking. As
international law itself has been made into a rational argument it follows that this also means
that “the law” exceeds the liberal allocation to a specific legal text, for example.

All that is written in the above and below should, in conclusion, be read in the light of

the Border-thinking genealogy which opposes this rationale. Border-thinking ruptures all
categories and leaves them open to be rethought without giving any specific designation to
them. Border-thinking as a method of decoloniality tries to destabilize modern concepts and
invites us to rewrite libraries, category-work, approaches and dictionaries in many different
ways. Postcolonial grammar is being replaced by a decolonial argument, which is not merely a
cosmetic intervention. It is with my invention of the term of “apostrophic impasse” that I
essentially try to name the legal inability to delink from the rational of modernity in

international law and venture on other ways in which our struggles can be formulated in a
manner that does not make sense for the legal mechanisms of capture.

10

THE STORIES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
During the last decade of the twenty-first century, the entire nomenclature of decolonial
literature has given rise to numerous theories which are used and abused in academic fields,
the regime of the global legal order, comrades, historians and the entire chassis of
modernity/coloniality/patriarchy/capitalism. The fabric of this first chapter is weaved with
idiosyncratic dismay not against legal decolonial theories per se, but rather with their deep

embeddedness in the seeds of coloniality that are equally resurfacing on the grounds that carry
a withering attempt to eradicate the colonial source. Decolonial legal theories are planted in
pursuit to stamp out the thorns of the earth, but when absorbing the offspring of colonialism
that viciously sprout underneath, it inherits the strands of these exact colonial seeds. It does,
then, not rid the world of the tyrants of coloniality nor does it have the ability to sweep them
from the colonial legal grass on which we parade, but decolonial theories, in contrast, are left
with the infinite reproduction of coloniality due to its roots in colonial thought. The manners in
which we allow decolonial theories to bloom matter as well as how we garden them when
seasons are changing, different colonial variants are erupting in the contemporary era and how
we acknowledge that the whispers of the wind rustle differently on the myriad of landscapes of
the globe.

Throughout this entire dissertation I will refer to the postcolonial body of work of renowned
legal academic Antony Anghie. His book Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International
Law (2005) tries to uncover the historical relationship between international law, colonialism
and the Third World. Anghie argues that the colonial encounter was central to the sovereignty
doctrine and the broader development of the international legal regime. This dissertation does
not oppose to the conclusions drawn by Anghie nor do I intend to dispute the tremendous

importance of his inquiry for the evolution of decolonial legal scholarship, however, I want to
draw attention to the limits of such postcolonial historiography and the broader creation of a
decolonial vocabulary, approach and methodology in the field of international law. Legal
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historians do not enter the world stage as bodiless storytellers developing chronicles of history
from unmarked lands or timeless records. Colonial legal histories traveled the planet with a
fictional pen of traditional legalism aimed at disciplining its colonial subjects into new volumes
of colonial modernity. But as the traditional historian anticipated the further eligibility of the
Third World, the intellectual and practical revolt against traditional historicities began way

prior to a conventional compilation of modern coloniality. The legacies of postcolonial criticism
and the opposition to the “Great Powers” existed long before any coming into being of a
postcolonial legal discipline. It finds roots in various anticolonial movements that resisted
imperial expansion, dispossession and the broader occupation of the Third World.8 After the
formal end of colonial reign over non-European people and the Bandung Conference of nonAlignment (1955), the critical legal school ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ (TWAIL)
arrived to burst the acclaimed universal bubble of the international legal order that ensures

continuous domination over the Global South. The critique of TWAIL works against the dialectic
of traditional international law that conceals, justifies and reproduces the series of doctrines
and principles that prospered from European colonial reign. International lawyers, political
leaders and anti-colonial movements from the Global South challenged the hierarchy of colonial
historical texts and developed a space in which critical theories arose on the horizon of the legal
order through different transnational alliances. Their grievance against the colonial cradle of
international law stimulated debates about the legal principles that governed international

relations, the objects of international law and the role of international organizations. The
promotion of decolonization through traditional institutional and legal doctrinal mechanisms,
however, ensured the ongoing importance of international law as the primary regulator of
inter-state relations. 9 The dominant presence of traditional international law during the
aftermath of colonialism shaped the social imaginary of what the ‘postcolonial’ world should
look like and left little room for the conceptualization of that lifeworld by newly independent
states or areas that were still ruled by colonial empires to determine their own singular position.
Declarations of independence did not move beyond Western-centric time regimes nor did any
8
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other legal body of work salvage former colonies from further spatial partition to the heirs of
the Westphalian state system. Despite the anticolonial opposition to the universalist nature of
legal theory, history and language, the decolonial approach of the Global South was quickly
reduced to a scribble on the margins. Subsequently, the “postcolonial” Third World was
disciplined into another realm of legal subjectivity as the new romance between the progress

narrative and international law prospered. The construction of the progress narrative offered
the colonial rulers in the Western empires a golden opportunity to divorce themselves from
their violent colonial affair. The colonial affair was by virtue of the progress narrative deemed a
past episode that stood separate from any further development of international law in the
future, without having to omit past and present deficiencies. This modern colonial technique
holds the power to tell the history of international law as a gradual story of progress.10
The postcolonial historiography of Antony Anghie (2005) invites us to revise the colonial

origins and technologies of international law as it critiques the Euro-centric notion that its
history, experience, laws and principles are universal. Revisionist postcolonial legal histories as
the latter are at length - unfortunately - by virtue of their situatedness in the dialectics of
universalist European historiography unable to escape the stronghold of coloniality as it seems
to have adopted a certain modern colonial progress genealogy. In part Anghie’s inability to
delink from colonial thought stems from his use of particular spatial and temporal rethorics
that emerged out of Western epistemologies and postmodern thought. Decolonial legal histories

aim to impede on the recreation of colonial trends and continuities by revising the discourse of
international law that are generated by an ethnographic and historical habitus of colonial
ontologies, while simultaneously attempting to develop an alternative legal project. What is
currently at stake, however, is an equal return to multiple concepts developed in the colonial
habitus and a recourse to early-European doctrines because the postcolonial critique is
animated by the use of colonial temporal and spatial categories. My general purpose, then, is to
identify these colonial structures in the postcolonial discourse in order to recognize the serious
limitations of current critical legal theories. I particularly ought to explore the ways in which
10
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Anghie’s revisionist postcolonial historiography entertains the aforementioned colonial
categories and is, in conclusion, merely producing a non-European variant of the same
universal European history which is not necessarily a decolonial practice.

14

CHAPTER
ONE
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY IN TIME
By scratching the history of Europe’s colonial development of international law, Antony Anghie

identified the social relations of coloniality that forged the global legal system and continue to
give rise to the ever-becoming coloniality of law (Chapter 2). But his text does not give an insight
into how spatial history and unitary historical time were configured by European thought which
later on also appeared in the modern/colonial regime of power, as well as in his own
postcolonial revisions. The world as we know it today has been theorized from within its own
effervescence and the legal encounters with the colonial network have been described from
inside that exact colonial/modern system.11 The temporal elements that have drawn the maps
for colonialism from 1492 onwards have crafted the modern realities in which we are confined
into linear borders, knowledge and histories. But the process of colonial craftsmanship itself
was and is not linear. It is rather an ongoing lived reality that takes on innumerable forms.
Polemical contentious rhetorics cannot defy the normative elements that sustain this

hermeneutic spiral of legal coloniality. Decoloniality, in contrast to this colonial technique, aims
to speak to and from different Europes, different temporal episodes, different spatial colonies
and variants of coloniality. Its potentia12 lies in its ability to mediate constructed differences
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instead of creating another analytical category of difference that holds polemical power to
dominate ‘over’ or becoming circular. Coloniality itself is grounded in a certain temporality that
functions as a difference producing mechanism,13 while decoloniality is not constrained to a set
horizon of visions of one particular moment or place. Even though Anghie succeeds in unveiling
the traditional view on the historical genesis of international law that holds colonialism to be an

unfortunate historical episode in the pheriperies, his method is not disruptive and is to the same
extent returning to origins of coloniality. 14 In the following part therefore I intend to
demonstrate how the legal decolonial tradition continues to be submerged in historical
categories of difference by the adaptation of Western-centric temporal and spatial historical
boundaries. The central inquiry of this dissertation is situated in the deconstruction of Anghie’s
postcolonial translation of legal history that failed to challenge the hegemony of colonial time
and spatial modernity and to demonstrate how this revision converted to the modern colonial

theology of progress and development.

PART I. COLONIAL TEMPORALITY AND THE (HI)STORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

For the legal realm to be global, meaning for law to be enforceable at every moment and in each
place, there has to be an absolute contract between the creation of legal subjectivity and
conceptions of time and space. With this existence of an absolute relationship between
jurisprudence and time and space, international law has gained a universal character. A
universal jurisprudential character here equals universal jurisdiction. There is, thus, a certain
logic behind the quantification and qualification of temporalities and spatialities. The latter
logics are used as axiological assessment imbued with normative connotations. Such

normativity differentiates and fragmentizes pastness, presentness and futurity over different
geographical areas and creates both a language and material conditions that sustain the need
for the law to function as a legal organizing mechanism. This establishment creates fragmented
Columbia L. REV. 48 (1948); Filippo Del Lucchese, Spinoza and constituent power, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
THEORY 15 (2016); Christopher Norris, SPINOZA AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CRITICAL THEORY (1991);
Dorothy Kwek, Power and the Multitude: A Spinozist View, 2 POLITICAL THEORY 48 (2015).
13 See Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, EMPIRE (2001).
14 Antony Anghie, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005), 3.
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concerns in pasts-presents-futures and spaces-places that continuously reproduce the basic
epistemic unit of international law. The legal subordination of time and space has produced
certain narratives that sustain the need for societal (re-)organization and this results in the
endlessness of the need for the law to reign. How should we then deconstruct the legal tradition
if it ushered in the era of “law and development” and the modern notion of progress? By

deconstructing the constructs of time in law we might also be able to grasp upon how subjects
are moved from external and internal colonization into modern coloniality. It is thus necessary
to return to the origins of the legal discipline as that is where the claim to power of international
law can be found. The source of power in any modern academic discipline is found in its
constructed reasoning and knowledge throughout history. The Foucauldian idea is that
knowledge encompasses more than the production of historicities, but the criticism of the
traditional historical method is essential to understand what knowledge without a turn to power

then encircles. The knowledge of historiography is located in the Western conception of ‘history
as an immanent and continuous process in chronological, or secular, time’.15 We, thus, need to
return to asking the foundational question on what the chronology of temporality actually
signifies in the legal realm. In other words, what does “time” mean, where does it originate from
and where is it heading? The relationship between history and time has, to say the least, been
crucial. So how, then, did we come to measure time and what role did it have for the writing of
legal histories and what is colonial about it? Anghie’s text ventured into a linear model of writing

history and, as a consequence, it keeps the clock of Modern hegemony ticking as it is located on
the line of historical progress. It is by primarily questioning the timeline of international law
that I hope to find answers as to the particular shapes of historicity, (post)modernity and
temporality.
Locating historical events in time is embedded in chronology. Chronological time is a
homogeneous encounter of different periodical episodes that discriminately consists of or
comprises events.16 Simply put, the chronology in time signifies the temporal order of things,

or more accurately, the order in which things are placed. A chronological order is, thus, a specific
15
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organizational pattern that predominantly structures different stories of ‘past’ sagas. The order
in the occurrence of time has become intertwined with the ways in which the stories of
international law are told. International law has increasingly become the epitome of “the order
of things” as it has laid out the larger demography of the legal field and determined methods to
construct legal arguments to sustain the law’s unfinishedness (Chapter 2). A temporal sequence

of events in and of itself, however, does not carry specific value; chronological stories do not
hold meaning of their own. The historical discourse and underlying historiography on which
certain stories are based is not a contemporaneity of the present, narration of past or the futural
predicament. It should rather be seen as expressions of personal and collective subjectivity in
an attempt to explain, justify and create certain realities. The subjective expressions are
narrated through the segregation of one specific moment as an isolated time that needs to be
singled out in contrast to other moments. The episodic othering of moments through these

subjective expressions are disguised as time, while in effect they are mere expressions of political
acts, moral justifications or made to serve a certain ideological purpose. In this manner, the
present and future are positioned into a specific relation to the past and moves present and
future away from the past. The value given to certain moments in time constructs a particular
historical process that aims to lay out the course of history in full. History would be impossible
to narrate in full if historians recount the beginning of time until the non-existent end of
infinity. But what even is the beginning of time? Questions as the latter are often met with

ideological answers, such as the start of the universe in the Big Bang theory or a reference to
Greenwich Meridian clock-time or an interpretation that periodized temporality from the
ministry of Jesus as the central reference of ‘the start’ of time. Regardless of the specific
correctness of these examples, the point I would like to make is that the concept of
“chronological synchronism” plays an integral part in any possible answer. A foundational
quandary in regards to the question of chronological international law is synchronism.
Synchronization in temporal notions occurs when specific events are either left out or included
by means of bundling differences together as one period or occurrence. Regardless of the
attunement of multiple events that do not necessarily warrant synchronization or the omissions
of interludes to suture the politics of a particular narrative, the historical fullness of these
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accounts is hardly ever questioned. Once an event is synchronized in the past-time; it is
destined to become a distant memory of pastness. This is a form of ‘chronopolitics’ that
distances presents and futures from the past. It, moreover, exonerates present and future
events that are exact or similar repetitions of the past. For example, the historical narration of
the colonization of Haiti, its revolution and the independence that followed are, in history,

presented as a past episode in time. The temporal description of Hatian independence as a
pastness exonerates colonial rulers from the consequences and aftermaths of colonization for
the contemporary and future in Haiti. The possibility of any form of cognitive justice beyond
this temporal construct of past-blame is by default denied. But the presumed pastness
surrounding independence from direct territorial reign over Haiti does not give insight where
exactly Haiti is located in this historical space. In relation to which present moment or which
futuric episode is the past of Haiti analyzed? Where has independent Haiti moved towards and

from where did it come? In addition, it is important to note that in chronopolitics (I) the pasttime exclusively occurs before the present and future and; (II) the past is without exception
inherently different from present and futures.17 In this temporal logic, the independence of Haiti
is given a certain historical location. This location comes (I) before the contemporary moment
and upcoming eras; the 1791-revolution is classified as a pastness that separates it from our
modern epoch and is placed even further away from future colonial occurrences. There is,
furthermore, an underlying assumption which illustrates that there is (II) a difference between

the now-time and approaching times, which is nothing more than just a temporal difference,
being the passing of linear time. The only function of chronopolitics is that it marks past events
by default as different from the present and future. But there does in reality not need to be a
tangible or material difference. The historization of colonial events with the underlying
assumption that the passage of time is linear contains elements of a chronological progress.
This chronological progress functions at the center of historical discourse. Dialogues
surrounding (I) pastness, however, always include elements of present and future because they
are (II) brought into relation with the past. (I) ‘Haiti was colonized in the past’ ⇢ (II) ‘Haiti is

17

Berber Bevernage, Tales of Pastness and Contemporaneity: On The Politics of Time in History and Anthropology,
20 RETHINKING HISTORY 3 (2006), 352, 353.

19

liberated now / in the future’. This gives the impression that the present and future are
ingrained in pastness itself, while the dividing lines between past - present - future are,
ironically, emphasized. But if these present and future elements are ingrained within the past,
what then is the exact assumed historical difference? Following this analogy the past is
constructed as an accumulative process of learning (III), while also reproducing colonialism in

the present and future. (I) ‘Haiti was colonized in the past’ ⇢ (II) ‘Haiti is liberated now/in the
future’ ⇢ (III) ‘after the Revolution, Haiti will not be placed under French colonial rule again’.
The global/local colonial and imperial practices over Haiti at present and in the future which
came after the French colonial rule, were reproduced through the same mechanism of French
colonial rule but is due to Hatian independence after the Revolution not acknowledged as such.
The same colonialism is reproduced, but merely in different forms and in different times. In
this epistemology of time, the past simply is ‘an endless series of past-presents’18 and/or ‘past-

futures’. Shedding light on a singular or multiple occasions in history - such as a revolution moreover, gives the impression that time is not a continuum. But rather, the cycle of historical
time constantly needs to be ‘broken’, because certain moments are given special attention and
absolute temporal value by subjective expressions. Time and history, in this sense, can never be
insignificant as these chronicle divisions cannot be left ‘empty’. There is no empty historical
moment, because the chronological cycle of time needs to be discontinued in order to
differentiate between past - present - future. If time is a continuum, or ‘neutral’, past - present

- future would have the same status and these temporal units would cease to exist. If these units
cease to exist, all events are laid out in a timeless manner. The past is now and upcoming, the
present has past and is yet to come, the future has past and is happening in this moment. In this
analogy, ‘Haiti did not gain freedom through spatial-temporal independence, it is not free and
it will not be freed’. In this zone of neutrality (or neutral-time), we are merely experiencing
different moments or things which are not necessarily linearly after another. Time is just a zone
in which things happen without subjective expressionism. In neutral-time, Haiti as a French
colony and Haiti as an independent nation exist, or better co-exist, simultaneously. But does
this simultaneity imply freedom? The freedom during simultaneous existence of moments is
18

Id.

20

not quantified or measured along the lines of ‘freedom then, now and/or later’. This
reincorporation of temporal notions are impossible, because of the mere fact that freedom itself
has an absolute and unconditional meaning. One is either ‘free’ or one is ‘not free’, there is no
modus in between; partial freedom is not freedom, but rather one is still ‘not free’. For the
colonized people of Haiti, whether passed ancestors, present inhabitants or future Hatians, this

would mean that freedom is not only ‘applied to people and things that are chronologically
simultaneous or co-existing’ 19 , but also is measured and directed towards that which was
formerly classified as past-people and future-people, since time is just a zone in which people
experience experiences. These experiences are as different and diverse as people themselves
can be, and are, more importantly, not shaped nor determined by the outside forces of
chronopolitics. Colonial history is not replaced by colonial histories, but rather surpassed by an
indivisible colonial multitude consisting of heterogeneous experiences rather than

homogeneous ignorance.
Historical synchronism has impacted the order of international law in global society and
situated it around the linear arrow of history. The arrow of traditional legal history has pierced

through the many dark events that led to the creation of international law and the ones that
occurred under its flag thereafter. The postcolonial revisional texts, such as Imperialism,
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, are therefore vital to get a broad understanding
of how historical synchronism had purposefully omitted its grim events or, at least, narrated
them in a manner that was beneficial to reinforce a legal chassis in line with traditional
jurisprudence. Placing the traditional histories of international law in a different order by
synchronizing them with the pitch black memoirs of the colonial encounter elucidates the

violent events of the makers of international law that had been wittingly left in the dark. It is,
thus, by uncovering the legal discourse on temporality that we are able to find answers as to
how and why lawyers have become consumed with the production and distribution of histories. The
stories of international law are not only told to first orchestrate and then stress the necessity

for the existence of the legal framework, but they also serve as a methodological technique that
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fabricates a false sense of legitimacy. The traditions of legal positivism and naturalism were not
concerned with conveying objective truths - if even there is such a thing - to construct
legitimacy, but rather made use of the implied authority that history held in society to be able
to set seal on their institutional power and justify their own precedence. Moreover, ‘[an]
author’s story about the past becomes the past for international law with no gaps or

discontinuities’.20 The international lawyer, instead, treats history as if it were a legislatable
body of work. The traditional histories of law are written in the same fashion as European
jurisprudence was enacted in the colonies; dictated as a sequence of undisputable rules that
traveled over distance. The traveling over distance, whether in time or through space, offers a
literal delay in temporality. The delay in temporality buys time to improve the position of
international law, or at least improve the narrative of international law.
The Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885 set out a series of meetings between
great European powers and the United States to negotiate the broader colonization of the
African continent so as to avoid internal rivalry between the colonial empires. The Conference
formalized the colonial partition of Africa with consensual international guidelines that justified

a brutal wave of imperialist expansion. The lawyers of the Conference drafted a General Act and
‘transformed Africa into a conceptual terra nullius’.21 Legal titles served as justifications for the
violent extraction of life and wealth in the entire African region. The Conference carried legal
significance not only because it formalized the ongoing process of colonization by means of
contemporary international law, but also because legal methods were used to transform and
combine different colonial ideologies to shared colonial rule. It was the instrument of law that
was used to encode an international colonial order and, with that, it gave a figure to legal colonial

temporality. Temporality does not embody one specific figure nor is it a socially neutral concept,
but it gives force to institutions that regulate the social sphere by shaping generic
conceptualizations and understanding of time. Temporality is another technique of power that,
just as law, structures human life and places it in the desired order. Time is consumed with
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capturing different forms of being and temporal influences configure the pace of our
movements in the world around us. Reflecting upon the significance of time in decolonial legal
analysis not only provides insight in the “here and now”, but also gives a central position to the
problem of living under modern coloniality. Colonial legal histories and decolonial analysis are
in need of temporal consciousness to be able to grasp upon the ways in which they contributed

and sustain the modern colonial continuum.
International law forced the peripheralized regions in the Third World into a vastly
slower pace of life by reinforcing colonial rule. This technology marked the beginning of gross

processes of underdevelopment in the Global South. Legal colonial temporality has mapped the
world into a ‘calculative and hierarchical world order that they deem necessary for the future of
humanity’,22 which turned out to be nothing short of complete Western rule over the Global
South. Their entrance into civilization transpired as a timeless foyer awaiting humanity as legal
doctrines were subjected to rigorously different meanings in the pheriperies. So what, then,
exactly does colonial legal temporality signify? The broad vessel of colonial expansion was
dependent on the rearrangement of histories, presents and futures that were deployed on the

piggyback of the civilizing mission-narrative. The civilizing mission was, in essence, an
inherently temporal story of ‘the grand project that has justified colonialism as a means of
redeeming the backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the nonEuropean world by incorporating them into the universal civilization of Europe’. 23 The
incorporation of the Third World into European civilization is a temporal technique of power.
International law finds its origins in the colonial agenda of the fifteenth century onwards as the
emergence of the discipline was rooted in finding the moral imperatives that justified brutal

colonization while simultaneously developing a framework that reigns over non-European
people. The legal story finds at its opening phrase the tales of European colonizers who
embarked on a journey to create the right conditions and moral imperatives for imperial
conquest. The history of the Eastern world was served on a plate to satiate the West’s hunger
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for Orientalism, but it were mainly the European endeavors in these regions that were given
importance and relevance in its “universal” history.24 The narrative was that of a people without
history and, thus, without any human development of their own. This story provided the right
conditions to construct an imperative need for a broad “civilizing mission”. The colonizers
determined that the people of the Third World were ‘not properly human, and could not be left

to themselves, but must be led towards civilization by other peoples. That is, by the peoples of
Europe..’25 In other words, the civilizing mission was supposed to move “uncivilized” indigenous
populations forward into the spheres of “civilization” and thereafter political development,
economic industrialization, modernity, and-so-forth. The legal tradition was, thus, primarily
concerned with the creation of a temporal story and subsequently also a mechanism that could
organize temporalities to move spaces and people forward or backward. Legal colonial
temporality then, in this view, signifies the epistemic practice of patterning material realities

into certain temporal logics, motions and hierarchical orders as a mode of organizing. It is legal
colonial temporality that engineers the theory of linear temporality as a straight forward line
with an absolute beginning, such as “the uncivilized”, and an absolute ending, such as “the
modern”. The temporal regime situated the Global North in a futuristic paradigm, while those
in the South were trapped in a continuum of pastness. Jurisprudence, as it was assigned with
pioneering the formalities of colonialism and subsequently an instrumentalist language of
operation in the colonies, became absorbed with keeping colonial subjects ‘hostage by the

Western idea of time and the belief that there is one single temporality: Western-imagined
fictional temporality’.26 The legal regulation of temporalities is a technology used by colonial
state-actors to discipline colonial subjects and domesticate fluid, nonlinear realities into solid
spheres of timekeeping. With timekeeping I do not necessarily refer toward homogeneous
Western clock-time, but rather towards the synchronization of fluid lifeworlds and experiences
into the engineered structural rhythm of the legal machine. There is, thus, a certain violent
harmonization of movement that has taken place during the development of international law
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in the time of active colonization. The latter functioned to the drums of legal temporal
organizing. This European modus operandi arranged the colonial relationship of time in a linear
manner that flattened the heterogeneity of “the real” and turned the globe into a static space.27
But how come traditional jurisprudence found incentives from “the fourth dimension of
reality”, being time, to master the events that take place in the static “three-dimensional” space?

I will touch base on this question in the following part.
PART II. THE TIMELESSNESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
So what is it then, this thing called “time”? The beginning? Is it physics? Maybe the portal
of death? God? The different species on earth have always been consumed by time in some
manner, but the phenomena of temporality itself is a question that has occupied the studies of
philosophy, religion, natural sciences and, as I argue, also jurisprudence. In this section I will
largely follow Antony Anghie’s historical account on the emergence of the legal discipline to
illustrate how the notion of temporal ordering was present in various manners during different
periods in the development of international law. The alternative historiography is traversing
the different relationalities of international law to colonialism from the sixteenth century

onwards until roughly the early 2000’s. For the purpose of this section I shall only touch upon
the key intellectual lines that shaped the canvas of naturalist and positivist jurisprudence during
the main period of imperial conquest and external colonization. It goes without saying that this
is an oversimplification of the entire historical trajectory of international law, but for the
purpose of our inquiry on the temporal character of international colonial jurisprudence these
shifts in legal character are crucial.
On the medieval European continent, the jurist of the sixteenth century was for the
majority part grounded in theology, history, classical studies and political literature besides the
early pre-modern field of law.28 The broader tradition of legal scholarship was anchored in the
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divine law of the Church, human law and natural law.29 The primary legal source during the
fifteenth century was founded upon the opinions of theologians and administered by the Pope’s
authority who claimed universal jurisdiction due to his ability to translate God’s will into legal
texts.30 For conquest into heathen territory, European sovereigns relied on the Pope’s approval
to legitimize their deemed “missionary expansion” of Christianity.31 But the Church, over time,

did not prove to be a legitimate source of reference when faced with inter-state affairs in the
religiously diverse demography of early-Europe and beyond.32 The universal jurisdiction of the
Pope started to shake after continuous confrontations between “Christian” nations and
heathens with customs embedded in other legal traditions. A secular version of divine law natural law - decapitated the Pope’s authoritarian position. But, until this day, the global
influence of the Catholic Church in the contemporary legal system and international
organizations and its time perceptions are tremendous.33 Naturalism, in contrast to divine law,

separated itself from the institutions of the Church but remained grounded in Christian
epistemology. In the beginning of the colonial enterprise the relationship between divine law,
human law and natural law was still being studied by jurists of the naturalist tradition. ‘Having
examined numerous theological authorities and incidents in the Bible, [the traditional jurist]
concludes that whatever punishments awaited them in their after-life, unbelievers such as the Indians
were not deprived of their property in the mundane realm merely by virtue of [their] status’. 34
According to Anghie, the secularization of natural law came into being in the sixteenth century

at the time of the Spanish imperial ravage in the West Indies. It was, at this particular moment
of conquest, that natural law ‘was proclaimed to be the basis of the new international law’.35 The
methodology

of

naturalist

jurisprudence

was,

as

said,

a

secularized

version

of

deinstitutionalized theological rhetorics. At the the height of European colonial warfare,
virtually all territories of Africa, Asia and the Pacific were left under the control of the “Great
29
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Powers” and around 1914 all colonies had been subjected to the forced assimilation to Europe’s
legal regime.36 The universalizing character of international jurisprudence, thus, conquered the
worlds roughly around the late nineteenth century. This was also ‘the period in which positivism
decisively replaced naturalism as the principal jurisprudential technique of the discipline of
international law. The sovereign was the foundation of positivist jurisprudence, and

nineteenth-century jurists sought to reconstruct the entire system of international law as a
creation of sovereign will.’37 With this development, the cardinal legal discourse on the order
amongst sovereign states came to surface and this pinnacle debate echoed through the entirety
of the twentieth century.38 Since the traditional approach did not consider non-European states
“sovereign” state-entities with legal personality, the order question in regards to the occupied
territories played a mere marginal role for the legal modern era as opposition from the part of
the colonies was, simply put, rendered theoretically irrelevant.39 Another important turn within

the era of legal positivism was the attempt of ‘defining law in such a manner as to establish a
sound basis for a science of jurisprudence, and rescuing it from the muddy speculations of
naturalists, threatened such pretensions by his categorical assertion that international law itself
was nothing more than morality’.40 As the traditional international lawyer tried to secure a
scientific place amongst the natural sciences such as physics and biology, the science of law
became a definite reality by the early nineteenth century. 41 The legal tradition had by then
indeed been declared a science; ‘an academic discipline taught separately from, on the one hand,

theology, philosophy and natural law and, on the other, civil law.’42 The positivist invention of
an onomatopoeic of the scientific method has had consequences for the approach and
application of law in the non-scientific realms that deal with inter-state relationalities and their
structures of biopower. The shift in the epistemic scientific paradigm of law as the harbor of
knowledge production led to ‘forms of legal argumentation evolved into the scientific method;
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the [legal] inquiry becomes observation and experiment’.43 Science revolves around gathering
forgeable facts through conducting empirical research. The objective of scientific research is to
be able to construct authentic knowledge on how the world around us functions. The bedrock
of truth

in science is founded through observations on physical realities measured in

quantifiables that go beyond theories. The debates in the field surrounding the scientific nature

of positivist jurisprudence and the attempted duplication thereof were still present during the
interwar period and in our contemporary era. The development of law into a science played a
pivotal role in the knowledge production in international law (Chapter 3).

The former genealogical evolution of jurisprudence is not only told over time and
grounded in time, but its lineage also is time. The divine/natural, secular/natural and
scientific/positivist juridical lines that measured the basis of law also configured the temporality
of the legal system. The historical emergence of jurisprudence is representative of the genealogy
of chronicle and linear time. History as a linear process is a modern concept that appeared on
the horizon before the secularization in naturalism and during the positivist rise of scientific
inquiry and ‘it was preceded by mythological and theological conceptions which discounted the

significance of chronological time for an understanding of the past’. 44 Early Christian
eschatology engulfed a variant of temporal chronology situated around human life on earth,
death and the resurrection of Jesus. Central to an apocalyptic text is the conviction that human
life is consummated by the return of the messias at ‘the time of the world’s end’.45 The theology
of life is lived in relation to the anticipation of the worldly epilogue and human temporality then
becomes the embodiment and measurement of time in absolute.46 The definite nature of this
canonical form of temporality stands in contrast with the doctrine of imminent parousia that

gleaned on a certain vertical temporality and timelessness, signposting the heavens and the
divine miracle of prophetic resurrection. Horizontal temporality on earth, conversely, is the
43
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chronological framing of mundane events and mortal conducts that altogether paint a picture
of human encounters, relations and experiences. The latter were regulated through the
legislation of laws that carried an equivalent temporal character. The temporal structure of
such legislation created the impression that moved the legal subject within vertical time
(mortality/Man) away from it towards horizontal time (immortality/heaven/salvation). This

temporal tendency is, for example, visible in the letters of Columbus after his first encounters
with the indigenous populations of the Americas.
“The eternal and almighty God, our Lord, it is Who gives to all who walk in His

way, victory over things apparently impossible, and in this case signally [..] But
our Redeemer has given victory to our most illustrious King and Queen, and to
their kingdoms rendered famous by this glorious event, at which all Christendom
should rejoice, celebrating it with great festivities and solemn Thanksgivings to
the Holy Trinity, with fervent prayers for the high distinction that will accrue to
them from turning so many peoples to our holy faith; and also from the temporal
benefits that not only Spain but all Christian nations will obtain”47
The writing of Columbus set in place the parameters for natural jurisprudence to later on
become the organizing mechanism that moves colonial subjects into legal colonial temporalities
and grants the West ‘temporal benefits’. The Spanish created the primary narrative that was

supposed to migrate the Arawak Indians of Española into the horizontal time away from the
vertical time in which they in reality lived according to Columbus. The chronology of
colonialism has, thus, been present in the first journals of colonial conquest until later times.

The existence of the horizontal and vertical interpretations of time in law changed with
the secularization of the legal tradition and the pseudo-separation from Christian ontoepistemology. As religious institutions became less authoritative in the legal realm, naturalist
jurisprudence gave longevity to the doctrinal perception that there is only one time; vertical
time. Vertical time is intrinsically linked with modernity and the conditioning of subjects into
47
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spheres of the Real as opposed to creating an image of life after death, another lived reality or
social imaginary. It is, thus, set on the creation of earthly time-consciousness and modern legal
subjects. This temporal structure envisions time as a linear genesis that divides rhythmic
patterns into three successive chronological moments. These successive chronological
moments are the units of human and systemic artificial memories of past - present - future.

The secular tripartite is subsiding the timeless stratosphere of paradise completely. The mortal
regions of past - present - future are rather a static place for legal subjects to reside in, unlike
being vested in a timeless afterlife. A deconstruction of temporality of vertical time illustrates
how the cycle of one continuous time has been broken by the temporal tripartite. The three
regions of time can, moreover, not be synchronized nor can they coexist simultaneously as the
production of strictly divided fragments has taken place. It has developed boundaries between
the past, present and future in which the lives of legal subjects are confined. This tendency

‘comforts us with the illusion that subjects can be defined by their historical conditions and that
change over time can be explained by historical development.’48 The legal reformation appeals
to the constructs of temporal tripartite and orders, assimilates and absorbs alternative notions
on time in this process. 49 But international law itself operates on a different temporality
altogether. The pastness of the law, for example, is ‘teleological in orientation, reflecting both a
continuity and a break with what came before, and often refracted through its promises for
social betterment and progress in a future that is yet to be realized.’50 A legal text, thus, divides

itself into a dual temporal partition, being that of a “before” and “after” the existence of a
particular rule and, then, once implemented a rule is embedded in the recital of a particular
futural archetype that it aims to secure. The invention of colonial rules to enact conquest and
subsequent legislation on internal social colonial organization in the Global South are then layed
out in the following sequence. Colonial laws became stories of historical progression; the before
situated around “uncivilized” past subjects before brutal Western invasion and the after
established the practice and coercive legislation built around colonization. The particular
futural archetype is the production of “civilized” nations in the peripheries. The temporalizing
48
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force of law, thus, created the colonial order by virtue of a specific dual process of situating the
past - present - future of colonial subjects as well as the past - present - future of international
law itself.
The assertion of jurisprudence as a science in the zenith of the positivist aeon had
further consequences for the burgeoning of temporal ordering. For classical physics time
feigned a measurable quantity with a metrical structure which assumed to have a certain
ordering. The scientific models that appeared in the “Age of Reason” had the objective of
explaining the ordering of events in the larger cosmos. The majority of scientific inquiries and

subsequent theories are set to find answers on the existence and nature of events in the
universe. The Enlightenment-jurist marks another shift in the construction of a particular time
orientation. Where the secular/natural and premature stage of positivism was occupied with
the vertical time of the mortal Man in the Real dimension, scientific positivism repositions Man
into the universal sphere, or in other words, a Hegelian universal. It is, thus, no wonder that
explicitly European law gained an absolute universal character in comparison to the conditional
universalist elements in naturalist jurisprudence. The branch of naturalist jurisprudence was

predominantly entertaining the justifications on the binding character of European law that
prevailed over any other local codes of conduct and governed interactions between European
colonizers and indigenous people during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Whereas the
scientific jurists had a mission to permanently and indefinitely force the entire collossal of
“universal” international rules upon the Third World. Anghie mentions that positivism as the
new analytic apparatus accounted for ‘the events which resulted in this dramatic development,
the universalization of international law and the formulation of a body of principles which was

understood to apply globally as a result of the annexation of ‘unoccupied’ territories such as the
continent of Australia, the conquest of large parts of Asia and the partitioning of Africa’. 51
Scientific jurisprudence turned to a meta-physical method of synchronizing the particulars of
the peripheries into the universal order of international law. The philosophical hermeneutics

in the “laws of physics”, in this view, subsumed the laws of the colonial temporal framework; a
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quasi-Hegelian absorption, assimilation and subsumption of the particulars into an abstract
universal. But what are the temporal dialectics that came to surface through the influence of the
sciences? Legal temporal dialectics became situated around the scientific monologue that alters
the order of the social and the time coordinates in coloniality. In physics, for example, the order
of events ‘allows [scientists] to explain them sequentially: one event can be the cause of a

subsequent event if its time variable is lower, or it could be the consequence of an event if its
time coordinate is higher. It is difficult, probably impossible, to devise a model of our universe,
if no ordering is defined for the model to describe the events’. 52 The order of the social is
changed by lowering the time variable in the colonies, in other words by trapping the Global
South in the past. Time as a coordinate of motions is based on the characterization of time as
‘locations in space, and moments in time. It is the only coordinate in which it is meaningful to
define an ordering in the values given, the order of time. This ordering defines an orientation,

called the arrow of time. It allows us to define an ordering (or at least a partial ordering) of all
events.’53 The laws of physics, in addition, calculate the next sequence of events and time then
becomes a calculable measure that instructs the order of a numerical set depending on the
relation of a particular formula and on the addition or subtraction of properties. International
law similarly became a tool to calculate the manners in which it could be used to under-develop
the Global South by the subtraction of properties and instruct a particular sequence in society
that would benefit the West in the times to come. The belief of time as a number, moreover,

stems from the Aristotelian ontological determination of time as ‘a number of motion in respect
to before and after’. This presupposes that there are telos in the passage of time. With the
inclusion of purpose or intentionality in the theory of linearity, it is unsurprising that the logic
of legal colonial temporality has harbored linearity to secure grounds to construct pathways
and legal arguments that lead to the completion of its objectives: imperialism and colonialism.
The linearity of legal colonial time, thus, held the potential for the objective of the colonization
as the objective of law to be realized. One of the consequences of the cachet of telos in linearity
is that the object and subject themselves become the center of gravity in time; real or imaginary.
52
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As the vast cycles of time move forward the subject is supposed to make forward motions
towards the objective. If the object of traditional jurisprudence was colonialism, colonialism
became the center of law. But, there is a catch in this reasoning; the subject does not necessarily
need to move forward for the objective to be reached. The line of progress automatically equates
the passage of time to forward motion and development,

regardless whether or not

development was achieved. The past is by default bad, the future is good and the present is nonexistent. In this analogy, if one tries to argue that the law has ‘progressed’ from colonial times,
it would be sufficient to illustrate colonial origins - thus side with Anghie - and simply lay out
that jurisprudence has since then moved in time. Moved in time here, does not mean that the
legal system has changed but rather that time passed. The law has, as said above, traveled over
distance, but is there then actually history in law? Or is the law just a sequence of synchronized
events over time? Overall, the scientific method of jurisprudence had, besides creating different

formulas to create and control temporality, also far-reaching consequences for the production
of ‘authentic’ knowledge on which I shall elaborate further in Chapter 3.
The human senses, in contrast to the above, allow us to experience the world around us

and tell a different story on time through the sensible perception of time as duration. Duration
is Henri Bergson’s central idea on the inner lived experiences and ways of being in a space in
contrast with objective time, the time created by the legal framework. The Bergsonian metaphysics accentuates the eminence of time as an internal state of pure duration resisting the
construct that temporality is a systemic measured quantity. It in essence, excludes the legal
temporal idea of succession, such as the succession in the regions of past - present - future, or
at least, categorizes these time-blocks as “another face of time”.54 But the human perception of

a “local present” and “now time”, for example, also gradually crumble if the subject is
conditioned into the assumption that there is merely a “global now” which is always evaluated
in relation to past and future. The global present moment is situated around the belief that the
Real, or in other words, that a universal (world) is not illusory. In this universal there is absolute

simultaneity in distant events of past - present - future, in contrast to duration in which we
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merely experience one thing after another in a cyclical non-temporal manner. As the reader is
glancing over this dissertation in her present time, I am experiencing present time at the
moment of writing. The end of this dissertation for me is already here at the moment that the
reader finds herself in the first chapter. The present and past moment for the both of us, thus,
exist at vastly different “times”. But legal temporality functions against this human intuition in

which the past, present and future do, in human reality, not necessarily exist. These segregated
moments are invented to substitute the universal world that international law designed,
standing in opposition to this other human perception of time as duration in which the future
has already passed.
In broad, understanding what legal colonial temporality means begins by challenging
Eurocentric epistemologies on time rather than assuming it,

55

while simultaneously

problematizing how international law has been deployed as a technology of temporality that
produces a certain flow or social order. Time assembled through law cannot be historicized or
understood alone in connection with history in which the development of jurisprudence
unraveled.56 Time in law is presupposed to be a natural phenomena instead of the outcome of

the system itself. Time is explained as a thing in which legal subjects are situated and in which
events take, will take or took place, but at what point does this explanation not suffice anymore?
PART III. THE LONG DUREE OF ANTONY ANGHIE

According to Anghie, the rhetoric of enforcement in the non-European territories of
existing judicial doctrines that were developed in Europe changed over the course of time. In
absence of an international legal framework at the time of the subjection to Spanish rules in the
West Indies enforcement was contingent upon the invention of a legal system that accounted
for the Spanish-Indian relations, or in other words, the colonial enterprise of the Spanish. Why
the establishment of a regulatory system of jurisprudence explicitly was considered necessary
to the colonial encounter does not become clear. But for Anghie it seems clear that ‘in any event,
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what can hardly be disputed is the central significance of law to the whole colonial enterprise’.57
I do not argue that law was not in fact of central significance, but rather I am more interested
in why law explicitly was paramount. The centrality of law to the early-European lawyers
themselves is evident given the amount of legal dialogues in classical texts, formation of
methodologies and approaches to construct legal arguments for colonialism and the overall

slow evolution of a universal system of international law during the colonial encounters. In
other words, the premature discipline of jurisprudence was seriously occupied with
engendering a sense of general importance of its own existence into the veins of societies. The
early lawyer was immersed with creating its own order before questions on the order of
international law or the problem of the order amongst sovereign states even existed. It is, then,
to be expected that international law in different facets was framed as a mechanism that forges
order by becoming the embodiment of order while simultaneously assembling new questions

regarding societal order. In this manner, international law duplicated the chronology in history
to the same degree to create a necessity of its existence. The order of temporal events, the order
of law, the order of colonies, and-so-on resemble nothing but a politically chosen order.
Chronology does, itself, not substantiate for the pragmatic justifications of synchronism,
meaning the scattering or exclusion, (re)allocation of events or elements disguised as (historical)
facts nor on the organizational pattern itself. It does not come to a surprise then that the
archaeology of ‘colonialism’ is often equated to law or described specifically as “colonial rule”

or the establishment of “foreign rule over particular territories and peoples”. International
jurisprudence was during the colonial encounter synchronized with colonialism and cannot
exist apart from it as it has become a monograph under its scope. International law might not
have invented colonialism, but colonialism framed as a question surrounding the order of states,
peoples and relations invented international law as an organizational pattern. Decolonial
practice and theory, in contrast, ‘sets out to change the order of the world, and is, obviously, a
program of complete disorder But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a
natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding’.58 Decolonial theory disrupts order and the legal
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framework that organizes order cannot be a part of the solution. But since the temporal
genealogies echoed in postcolonial analysis and other mechanisms of resistance the
postcolonial state was not significantly different from the colonial state, both of them still relied
on the same identical institutional bodies.59
Anghie asserts that the problem of the order among sovereign states was a false
conventional narrative needed to justify the application of European law in colonial territories
and for the (re)conceptualization of colonial judicial doctrines. The first teachings on natural
law by Francisco de Vittoria and positivist jurisprudence later on, confirmed for Anghie that

jurists were not concerned with the problem of order amongst sovereign nations, but rather
with ‘the order among societies belonging to two different cultural systems’.60 Moreover, it was
a misconception that founding principles and doctrines of international law were developed in
the West and merely applied in the non-European world.61 The exclusion from the sovereignty
doctrine in the Third World as a pivotal technique of colonial legalism, was not just the bare
application of customs developed in the Western world. Rather the doctrine of ‘sovereignty
acquired its character through the colonial encounter. This is the darker history of sovereignty

which cannot be explored or understood by any account of sovereignty doctrine assuming the
existence of sovereign states.’62 Positioning international law first in the colonial sequence of
time as an epistemic temporal practice set out to create colonial subjects, allows for an
understanding of the temporal rhetoric of the ‘dynamic of difference’ as the primary flow of
law. Anghie argues that the civilizing mission was animated by the question of the dynamic of
difference, as well as that it formed the foundation of colonial judicial doctrines throughout the
entire evolution of international law. 63 The dynamic of difference is ‘an endless process of

creating a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilized and the other
as ‘particular’ and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to
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normalize the aberrant society’ 64 based on the ‘imperial idea that fundamental cultural
differences divided the European and non-European worlds’ as well as the presumed
dichotomy between two worlds ‘civilized/uncivilized’. 65 Chronological synchronicity and a
particular periodization of time in general was, thus, not only top-tier in the development of
the discipline, but has also found home in the postcolonial revision. But why exactly do I find

axiological importance in complicating the mimics of colonial time in writing alternative stories
of international law? Just as the apalogue of “global history’” is too indefinite to unreservedly
sync grand events of different timescales and geological places, the concept of time itself has
mainly materialized in legal histories in a normative manner; a historical expression of linear
periodization. Linear periodization has molded a particular shape to the experiences with the
colonial encounter and has subsequently also been integrated in the framework of law and
postcolonial analysis. In Anghie’s analysis it has predominantly returned in his notion of the

dynamic of difference. He tracks the dynamic in a normative and linear manner built in the
sequence of historical time. The different forms of sovereignty applied to colonies in the Third
World as opposed to the sovereignty of the Western hemispheres and the subsequent
determination of legal personality is, according to Anghie, negated by traditional lawyers
through various applications of the dynamic of difference. The dynamic is ‘self-sustaining [and]
endless; each act of arrival reveals further horizons, each act of bridging further differences
that international law must seek to overcome. It is in this way that international law extends

itself horizontally, to encompass the entire globe and, once this is achieved, vertically, within
each society, to ensure the emergence of civilized states’.66 The employment of the dynamic
method is, through Anghie’s eyes, situated at the beginning of international law and was
regenerated in the era of positivism.67 It foreshadows the concepts and dichotomies that in a
conventional understanding formed the foundations of the international legal order as
difference producing mechanisms based on historical categories of (cultural) difference.68
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‘In summary, the distinction between the civilized and uncivilized was a
fundamental tenet of positivist epistemology and thus profoundly shaped the
concepts constituting the positivist framework. The racialization of positivist law
followed inevitably from these premises - as demonstrated, for example, by the
argument that law was the creation of unique, civilized and social institutions and
that only states possessing such institutions could be members of ‘international

society’. In distinguishing between the civilized and uncivilized at all these
different levels, positivist jurisprudence created the first element of what I have
termed the ‘dynamic of difference’, the postulation of a gap between the
European and non-European worlds which had to be bridged by positivist
international law.’69
The Western-centric temporal effects on Anghie’s historical consciousness has situated the
dynamic of difference as a signifier for a putative era of the colonial. The dynamic is employed
in the sequence of time, which is problematic for the following reasons. It - albeit

unintentionally - ushers in a specific epoch of colonialism which can lateron be separated from
future epochs. Once colonialism is separated in any temporal manner in the sequence of time
as an epoch instead of positioned as an unfinished colonial-continuum, it becomes susceptible
to be caught in the web of the progress narrative. The progress theology gives power to the idea
that colonialism was a pastness and that international law has since been ‘better’. The former
imperial powers can then draw parallels between the colonial period and the state of
international law today.70 A parallel as the latter does not give an insight as to if there in effect

was betterment, because it is essentially an ‘empty’ temporal frame that is being analyzed. For
temporal framing the mere passage of time is sufficient to convince others that the object of
inquiry has progressed. There is hardly any insight on the basis of which empirical data the
conclusion was drawn. Even if there was insight in such data, it remains a mere matter of

subjective interpretation. Mainly because progress in such analysis is an automatic linear
forward movement in time and ‘the precise relationship between values and forward movement
is not explained, but taken as self-evident’.71 In this regard, Thomas Skouteris (2016) claims that
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the rationale why such temporal-progress query operates as self-referentially is because the
telos of progress erupts in a liberal demography of progress ‘which is never spelled out but
assumed as true throughout the text. This narrative adopts the said values as yardsticks of
progressive internationalism over the past hundred years. The liberal-democratic narrative,
however, is not questioned’.72 The dynamic difference then carries the risk that its validity is

subjected to be measured in and through time. The historical trajectory of international law
since the period of Anghie’s analysis - the sixteenth century until the end of formal colonialism
and political independence of former colonized nations - is a long stretch in time. It, at least, is
enough time to construct reasons that claim postcolonial history is in effect a history instead of
a recent occurrence. As pointed out by Anghie, the legal argumentations that sustained the
dynamic have themselves also changed over time. Conventional international lawyers can, thus,
easily discredit the conclusions drawn by Anghie by making a claim to the progress-argument

pointing to the forward directionality of the discipline equated by the passage of time. The
passage of time follows the binary structure of the legal progress argument and, in most cases,
favors traditional jurisprudence.73 But, unfortunately, it is not even the dialectics of progress
that has cornered Anghie’s revisions in a dangerously colonial manner. Rather it is the easyadoption of Anghie’s findings into the progress story of international law. Even though the
history of colonialism and modern coloniality seem irreconcilable with the contemporary
objectives of international law on paper - such as the articulations of human rights conventions,

the Charter of the United Nations, declarations of peace, principles on humanitarianism, the
prohibition on the use of force, etcetera - the praxis of the states that use international law for
the opposite tell a rigorously different story. It can, thus, never be an attempt to reconcile the
letters of international law with an unsynchronised decolonial strive to resituate the history,
critique the present and implicate the future. If postcolonial stories turn into blank signifiers
that in time can be colored in by colonial dialectics and systems, the giant of coloniality is not
to the least unsettled, disrupted or even woken up. In contrast, coloniality is saved by the
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postcolonial window of opportunity that will move it to innocence. 74

The system of

international law, then, ‘becomes without becoming’ and is set to reproduce ‘the other as “notI” within rather than beyond the structure of the “I”’.75 In other words, the use of a historical
narration that has adopted the sequence of time would allow international law to superficially
appropriate ‘postcolonial’ stories with an extensive level of hybridity. The use of a vague term

such as ‘dynamic of difference’ lends itself, moreover, to equate legal practices to theories that
are imitating postcolonial theories, while, in effect, subsuming completely to the directives of
the decolonial practice and theory. This leads to the domestication of decolonization within the
spheres of international law because the law accommodates ambiguity. The language of
jurisprudence consists for its majority of linguistic indeterminacy and leaves an incredible
amount of room for uncertainties or ambivalences. The use of indeterminate semantics words
in legal texts generically produces ambiguity. Due to ambiguity the legal vocabulary is

susceptible to be interpreted and argued in numerous manners. Adopting the language of law,
which includes ambiguous terms, builts new bridges for further colonial power relations and
has positioned this postcolonial revision at the feet of modern colonial dialectic. This is, in
short, the result of the incorporation of temporal ontologies that were developed in the Western
world by classical postcolonial approaches that ‘emphasized nominal and categorical rather
than conceptual or epistemological issues’. 76 The basis of temporal history that has been
established in European epistemologies has, in this manner, also found its way into the branch

of postcolonial legal theory.
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CHAPTER
TWO
POSTCOLONIAL LEGALISMS

The traditional ahistorical emergence of international law as the primary inquiry and
method of regulating human interactions, lacked consistent theory on the nature of
international law and the raison d'être of law specifically as it was made to function as the
magnum opus of colonial empires woven into the social fabric of (international) relations.77 The
liberal historical debate surrounding the nature of international law has been deliberately
paradoxical as a complex system of sovereign, positive morality and political formalism. 78
Decolonial legal histories do not necessarily negate this ahistorical narration, but are rather a

part of that exact colonial narration because it did not summon alternative ways of writing
history nor did it restructure chronicle time or unsettle linear spatialities, as it merely gave
different and decolonial interpretations to (occurances in) international law. Anghie’s historical
narration guaranteed that the progress narrative of traditional lawyers could build onto his
counter-narration, while simultaneously appropriating the subaltern notion of the postcolonial trend into a version that suited their post-modern logic and political agenda. In
addition, the larger organization of the post-colonial reality by the legal regime and inclusion
of legal dialogue in the decolonial approach, restructured an intimate relationship between the
peripheries and the empires. It influenced different forms of legal practices, including the
formations of subsequent legal subjectivity in the Third World to encapsulate the entire political
technology of post-colonial and subaltern life. The legal doctrine of old and new ‘sovereign’

states that function as the objects and reflection of the existence of a legal order banished law
to an epiphenomenality. Decolonial matters and the overall human existence, however, exceed
abstracticalities and arithmetical structures. It is thus, that with the ahistorical as well as with
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historical classification of the ‘legal’ that the humanness of the anthropomorphic individual is
gradually moved into the apogee of pre-humanness; a legal subjective proletariat which is hyper
impersonalized and hyper abstracted. In order to understand the concept of complete
humanness (‘being’) and pre-humanness (‘becoming’), I borrow from the Deleuzo-Guattarian
register of ‘human becomings’ to understand how the legal form and legality materializes out of

the ashes of pre-humanness.79 In earlier work, Deleuze finds that ‘becomings’ - similar to the
colonial origin of law - are deemed into a certain level of ahistoricity. According to Deleuze,
historiography is associated with dialectics and substance, while historical narrations cannot
explain nor reveal the essence and meaning of ‘becomings’.80 History itself does not become and
what becomes is ubiquitous and can, therefore, not be subjected to any historical classification
as it is continously ‘becoming’.81 In this manner, decolonial historicity is not a rejection nor
negation of Western thought, but in fact functions at the heart of the diagnosis of the legal

progress theology. In addition, humans themselves are also, without exception, people to come
and ‘be-coming’ is ‘not to attain a form [..] but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or
indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a
molecule—neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and non-preexistent, singularized out
of a population rather than determined in a form’.82 This meta-physical ideology of becoming
or the ‘becoming’ of systems and Man does not attain a specific form, but they are destined to
dwell in a zone of indifferent proximity. The subjects of the legal are categorized in different

colonial classes, while the specific subjects themselves - humans in the material dimension and
‘new’ states in the post-colonial epoch of law - are as a consequence deprived from the
embodiment of personalized specificalities or particularities. In this hidden abode of the human
legal reality being and becoming are seen in relation to transformation (or progress); one is
‘becoming’ before it is allowed to ‘be(ing)’. This philosophy epitomizes the morphing from one
sphere into the following by virtue of colonial threshold concepts situated around progress
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theology. Especially visible in the crucial spheres of the ‘becoming’ of a colonized space and
people impending on the transition into the status of a ‘liberated’ people or a ‘sovereign’ nation.
In the Deleuzo philosophy there is an inherent distinction made between human-‘being’ and
human-‘becoming’. The condition of being indicates the state of an individual's nature and/or
behavior at present, while becoming reflects the passage and transformation of one’s current

state towards the futuristic paradigm of desired or imposed modification of the existent,
naturalized self. According to Deleuze and Guattari there is ‘[a] reality specific to becoming’ and
‘becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own’.83 There is, thus, a subliminal space in which
the human is not a ‘being’, but merely a ‘becoming’; the latter exceeds any socio-political or
biological kinetic of life. The state of the human becoming in the legal plane consists of
abstracted implications that, akin to all collective categories and enunciations, are undermining
the fluidity of humanness present in individual lives and experiences. The organization of

human lives into legal categories reflect the ‘becoming’ of humans far from any decolonial
realm. The possibility of the transfer from ‘becoming’ into ‘being’ only seems possible if one
complies with the subjection to colonial rules, norms and theories specific to colonial
domination. In this manner, the ‘becoming’ not only aims to transition to ‘being’, but the
surrounding material liveworlds are also converted into a legal colonial reality. The colonized
spaces and humans are then forced to accept the complicated imperatives of their uncertain
classification accompanied by the (deprivation of) rights and are notably more restricted in their

general behavior during their quest for ‘liberation’ in the face of the inherent precariousness of
their pending application to ‘being’. Theories such as the latter have been largely proved in
decolonial legal texts, but these texts are, as stated above, equally written in the dialectical
rhetorics of coloniality. The array of post-modern conundra, interpretations and approaches to
international law as a counter-method of regulating and (re-)structuring lived relations has,
thus, generated a series of theoretical and postulatory impasses. An impasse marks ‘a situation
in which progress is blocked; an insurmountable difficulty; deadlock’84 or denote ‘(i) a passage
open only at one end; blind alley; or (ii) a situation offering no escape, as a difficulty without
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solution, an argument where no agreement is possible, etc.’ 85 In an attempt to resolve the
impasse of the ‘ever-becoming’ coloniality of law, decolonial legal theories for the most part have
added a mere apostrophe (‘). The apostrophe, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, is a mere
symbol that does not hold any significance of its own, but is instead exclusively used in writing
to indicate either (i) particular possessions or belongings; (ii) signify the abbreviation or

contraction of two or more words; or (iii) in connection with (periods of) time, the apostrophe
+s show duration.86 My main concern is that critical legal theories challenging colonial notions
do not hold any significance of their own as they are trapped in the deadlock of the unfinished
and ever-becoming coloniality of law. The colonial passage of law is only open at one end; it has
crafted the relational space that precisely demarks the ways in which the system can be
challenged on its own terms. The apostrophic impasse then signifies the contraction of legal
decoloniality which is that (i) the decolonial belongs to the ever-becoming realm of the colonial;

(ii) is trapped in the dichotomy of colonial/decolonial; (iii) connects colonialism to a certain
period in time and space in line with the progress narrative.

PART I. THE APOSTROPHIC IMPASSE OF LEGAL DECOLONIZATION

‘The world is following this Conference with great interest and high hopes. With great
interest, because our gathering together on this large scale is a new and unique
phenomenon in history. With high hope, because many all over the world expect us to
show them a way out of the impasse we find ourselves in to-day’ 87
- Ali Sastroamidjojo
These words of Ali Sastroamidjojo, Chairman of the Asian-African Conference, lawyer and

former Prime Minister of Indonesia, danced around the ears of the attendees of the Bandung
Conference and those listening closely from afar, as he pushed for the lexicon of postcolonialism to be moved beyond a mere glossary that signifies a terminology, a linear historical
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period or a location on the map of these new “sovereign” nations. The high hope was needed for
decoloniality to reside in the pluriverse regions of this mundane orbit as a nouveau modus
vivandi. But as the world took note of Sastroamidjojo’s own hope for new decolonial phenomena
to arise and generate a future free from coloniality, traditional international law domesticated
the post-colonial sentiment into a modern assembly of coloniality. The constructed pastness

surrounding colonialism encouraged the belief that colonial occupation was not an expression
of international law or the states that founded the discipline, but rather that of a time before it.
The ghost of colonialism seemed to have become an invisible evil entity of bygone days. The
central Western conviction that ‘there is progress in international law and that international
law contributes to progress in a general sense’ was, on the whole, predominant.88 Tendencies
such as the latter have set the larger tone of the postcolonial question and shifted the focus in
the after-Cold War period to finding ways to move “forward” in the world, as well as with

international law. Sastroamidjojo’s brave efforts of orchestrating Third World coalitions set to
guide societies out of the colonial impasse sadly never came to full force. Instead, the impasse,
I argue, has found home in legal belles-letters and critical methodologies alike. The fine arts of
literary juridical criticism are lingering in what I identify as an apostropic impasse. At first
glance, the marriage between the words ‘apostrophe’ and ‘impasse’ does neither from a
grammatical or from a rational perspective make any sense. But an innate postmodern desire
of rational sensemaking, in the end, mystifies the multiplexity of colonial realities in conditioned

spaces and past/present/future-thinking. Such tendency integrates our relationships to power
into simplified modalities and material revenues that only allow for shackled inhabiting of the
worlds based on modern and Western-centric philosophies. This logic of coloniality, then, holds
the power to mystify the ways in which it structurally categorizes experiences of encounters
with the colonial legal system. The categorization of experiences - and eventually the denial
thereof - is needed in order to determine the legal strategies that can prevail over any deviation
from the rationale of the project of international law itself. With the passage of time, colonial
mystification led to the production of ‘nonsensical’ regulatory institutions and a resort to
liminal locus of enunciation. The human encounter and our relationship to the colonial itself
88
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can, however, not be archived in an imagined institutional register that goes by the name of
international law.

The experiences and cognitive perceptions of human existence under legal
institutionalization lay bare what João Biehl and Peter Locke (2017) identified as the ethnographic

sensorium. The ethnographic sensorium is the bundling of moments and stories that are
‘[..]incomplete views on subjects and lifeworlds in the process of becoming. Taken together, they
make up an ethnographic sensorium: a multifaceted and affective point of contact with worlds
of inequality, hovering on the verge of exhaustion while also harboring the potential for things
to be otherwise’.89 The anthropology of becoming is concerned with the plasticity of power90
and the effect thereof on experienced and imagined situatedness in the world, while
simultaneously being conscious of how institutionalized power and knowledge relentlessly

structure subjectivity. 91 It is at this point that the ethnographic sensorium becomes an
important instrument to understand how international law has confined its antagonists to
plastic power and why the Bandung states presented ‘themselves as quintessential international
subjects’92 that held the acquisition of Third World sovereignty in high regard. The formalist
model of the sovereignty doctrine developed by jurists of the sixteenth century does - according
to traditional approaches - not hold the capacity to create order amongst states, and, in the
absence of an overarching authority that would be able to enforce and articulate relevant law,

conventional jurisprudence was met with a fundamental obstacle on the road to the legal
paradigm.93 The question surrounding the order of sovereign states continues to be one of the
central questions of the discipline as it determines whether or not these sovereign nations are
bound by the legal framework. The colonial process through which non-European states were
banned from the family of international law, finds origins in the European invention of racial
89
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and cultural categories that emanates constructed distinctions between European and nonEuropean populations.94 The rhetoric on which the Third World exclusion from international
law was based gives an insight into the colonial relationship between the empires and the nonEuropean world. In order to justify colonial expansion and subjugation, early jurisprudence
developed modes of legal thinking that could account for the denial of sovereignty in the

colonies. The colonies that lacked sovereignty and the connection between sovereignty and
culture were ‘embodied by the fundamentalist proposition that only European states could be
sovereign’. 95 Acceptance of sovereignty or the acquisition of Third World sovereignty was,
according to Anghie, by default an acceptance of the supreme reign of the exclusionary doctrine
and Europe’s exclusivity as the sole sovereign. The latter postcolonial analysis conveyed that ‘[it]
creates a conceptual framework within which the only history of the non-European world which
may be written by the discipline is the history of its absorption into the European world in order

to progress towards the ultimate point of acquiring sovereignty’. 96 The consequence of
acceptance to these premises would then lead to a ‘linear, evolutionary scheme in which the
non-European world is the past and the European world the future. Thus, while the nonEuropean world may illuminate aspects of the past of the European world that may otherwise
remain hidden, the complex work of the future lies in the elaboration of established sovereignty,
an elaboration which occurs through an examination of the conceptual problems arising from
the interaction of sovereign European states.’97 For Anghie the acquisition of sovereignty by the

Third World was, in effect, the acquisition of European civilization.98 In this sense Anghie seems
to position law as a project with clear objectives with a foreseeable outcome, being the global
adaptation to Europeanness. While I do not dispute that the assimilation to European civilization
was an outcome of the colonial encounter and the Third World acquisition of sovereignty,
Anghie failed to consider that international law is perpetually unfinished and the theology of
progress is contingent on its own unfinishedness. The unfinishedness has as a consequence that
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the objectives and scope of the legal regime do not appear to subjects at present, they appear on
a sliding scale once the aftermath can be made up. Only in the ashes of the ruins, the looting
and plunder under the law becomes visible. The acts of states under international law are not
meant to construct sole events, but rather following practice of nation-states they lead to a
particular pattern or structure. The colonial relationship that eschewed the acquisition of Third

World sovereignty only comes into being in the wake of the incomplete stories in the material
world of the ethnographic sensorium. If international law had a clear objective or a final
destination, law would have ceased to exist once the assimilation to European civilization was
secured by the rhetoric of the sovereignty doctrine. Jurisprudence is, at contrast, kindled by the
anthropology of becoming preying on the unfinishedness of international subjects and
lifeworlds to sustain its own essence. The subjects of international law are made to reside in an
unclear futuristic paradigm of becoming. Their stories are able to be told in retrospect alone,

but we cannot read into the concluding chapter. The words of Sastroamidjojo are now being
read against the outcome of the Bandung Conference. The fresh words that dawned upon his
audience with such childlike faith, that the world could almost taste his faroff hunger for a
potential Otherwise, before it was swallowed by the quicksand of lawyers. If words covered in
high hope find their way to the inked papers of legal codification, the hungry will surely die.

The perpetual state of ‘becoming’ of international law is kept alive through countless

reiterations of the legal project, such as methods of positivist interpretation, traditional
jurisprudence and even through the reflections on law in decolonial theories and revisionist
historiographies. The perpetual becoming of legal coloniality means that neither the collective
nor the singular relationality to it can be statically identified in critical theories or synoptic
(de)colonial historicities, as coloniality itself is by virtue of its altering nature of becoming,
undefinable. Anghie, however, attempts to make the colonial unfinishedness of international
law definable by - rightfully so - disputing the historical colonial jurisprudence and replacing it
in postcolonial historical revision. While this tactic does shake the colonial storyline of
conventional jurisprudence, it is also limited because it seeks to give colonialism and coloniality
a name. To name colonialities in this manner is also to pretend that non-colonial spaces have
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materialized in the legal regime. Emphasis is placed on “in” because unanticipated actions of
anti-colonial movements have been successful at disrupting the structure of international law
from the outside, but these changes did not come from within the law itself. To attempt to define
coloniality or name “old” colonial praxis imprisons decoloniality in modern epistemologies.99
At most, modern epistemologies bring us to a deterministic process of categorizing doctrines,

state-behavior, legal sources, and-so-forth as “colonial” or “non-colonial”. But coloniality is not
a spectrum in which merely the material, visible or measurable effects, doctrines or legal
methodologies fall under its scope. Rather, it is an ontology of indefinite becoming and its flow
is perpetually unfinished. Moreover, there is no such thing as a “non-colonial” international law.
Even though critical legal schools such as TWAIL give the impression that there is an “outside”
of the colonial border within the future of international law, the framework can however not be
decolonized. There are many juridical practices and doctrines scholars classified as “colonial”

and I do not dispute these classifications. I am, however, problematizing the decolonial lense
that zooms in on the inclusion of X, Y, Z in the black-book of “colonial” los, while subsiding the
focus from the entire alphabet as if letters have any meaning on their own. If Anghie, for
example, argues that denial of full legal subjectivity was animated by the the supremacy of the
European culture and the “dynamic of difference” had the power to exclude non-Europeans,100
would omitting the former racialization in positivist jurisprudence then “decolonize”
international law? The answer is negative. There is nothing non-colonial about law and there is

nothing to “decolonize” in an unfinished system that has legitimized the unleashing of sheer evil
upon the non-Western world. Post-colonial revisions are the epicenter of the legal ethnographic
sensorium. They are incomplete stories, experiences and trajectories that continue to long for
the imperatives of restoration and innovation in the realms of the plasticity of power. The plastic
power of people, worlds and thought in the anthropology of becoming is also ‘to fix the degree
and the limits to the memory of the past, if it is not to become the gravedigger of the present [..]
I mean the power of specifically growing out of one's self, of making the past and the strange
one body with the near and the present, of healing wounds, replacing what is lost, repairing
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broken molds.’ 101 Haunted between the colonial heritage and the modern world, ‘between
conflicting orders to remember and renew the past, and to built the present and future upon
the past’s erasure’,102 the critical legal scholar is caught by an unimaginable life-sentence: it is
either abandoning his own prestigious position in legal scholarship or he has to thicken up the
relationship between decolonial resistance and international law. As the career in academia

coaxed for the majority, critical lawyers attempt to add a piece to substantiate the claim against
the colonial puzzle of jurisprudence, while consciously knowing to be unable to complete the
unraveling of the expanding enigma of legal coloniality.
On the line of the legal enigma of coloniality, Aníbal Quijano’s articulation of the
coloniality of power argues that modern power structures that operate on a global or hegemonic
level - such as law - by default accommodate an element of coloniality.103 The nested elements
of coloniality in the legal framework led to the ontological expansion of “old” colonialism into

“new” modern legal coloniality. The incorporation into the system of legal modern coloniality
‘involved a process of historical re-identification; from Europe such regions and populations
were attributed new geocultural identities’.104 The adoption of the postcolonial identity and the
“postcolonial” state in the progress story of international law was, thus, an inseparable part in
this process regardless whether or not it exposes Europe’s dark past; the myth of the
culmination of a civilizing trajectory is kept alive. The acquisition of Third World sovereignty
herein is, as many pointed out before me, not a victory. The legal invention could and cannot be

decolonized since it pioneers European thought and was created to obtain its hegemony. The
new model of global legal power includes the post-colonial state, people and to some extent
also accommodates critical theories. The incorporation of delineated colonial variants based on
the postcolonial critique and the (partial) adoption thereof in the discourse concentrated all
forms of resistance into a Western system of ‘knowledge and the production of knowledge under
its hegemony’.105 With hegemony over knowledge production the former empires ‘generated a
101

Friedrich Nietzsche, ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE (1874), 7.
Jeffrey T. Schnapp, Flash Memories (Sironi on Exhibit), 21 South Central Rev. 1 (2004), 23.
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new temporal perspective of history and relocated the colonized population, along with their
respective histories and cultures, in the past of a historical trajectory whose culmination was
Europe’. 106 The global citadel of coloniality cannot be stormed with its own ‘rhetoric of
modernity, the logic of coloniality, and the West’s global model’ as armor.107 By taking up the
arms of Western knowledge and knowledge production, postcolonial revisions will equally

employ the linear development of progress and therefore also adopt a method of dispossession
of the human as the subjects of life through the integration of the human into an object of law.
The dispossession of the human element produces a discourse situated around a universalizing
legal theory which ought to be applied to all human matters of different temporalities and in
different geographical spaces, while not being necessarily concerned with the pluriverse
dynamics and singularities of life and ‘human-becomings’. If the postcolonial legal approach
aims for the adaptation of his notions in legal theory, it ensures an equal return to the colonial

spiral of international law. This flattens life and abstracts any decolonial essence into legal
categories and modes of thought. The type of justice that decolonizing efforts aim towards
cannot be found in the interiors of the system that mobilizes structural oppression until this
day. The inclusion of the postcolonial approach in the legal system leads to the domestication
of the radicality of the decolonial approach. Such lenient forms of decoloniality then, at most,
gets rid of visible external colonialism while increasing internal colonial intensity within the
legal system. Alternative stories such as the revisionist text at hand, are only set to create an

abstract category out of decolonization ensuing on material decolonization within the legal
order. The “dynamic of difference” has indeed proved that legal colonialism carried a racial
central line in origin and character, ‘but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the
colonialism in whose matrix it was established’.108
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PART II. THE PLACE OF THE APOSTROPHIC IMPASSE

Antony Anghie argues that the formation of international law and the subsequent
development thereof is based on the invention of empirical particularities to the Global South
and the creation of a register of historical difference in contrast with the Western empires. But
Anghie’s historiography is to the same degree seeking to ‘legitimize itself by stressing its
capacity to construct universal grammars’ and creates classes of historical difference. 109
Postcolonial revisions still revolve around and depart from the European experience of
history.110 In this regard Vivek Chibber (2003) notes that if ‘there does not exist a fundamental

divergence between East and West... then we are permitted to consider the possibility that the
theories emerging from the European experience might well be up to the task of capturing the
basic structure of Eastern development in the modern epoch. Instead of being entirely different
forms of society, the West and the non-West would, according to this perspective, turn out to
be variants of the same species.’111 The colonized territories were not only prima facie the objects
of theoretical inquiry for the creation of international law, but also for the trajectory of the
coming into being of the idea of Europe. These geographies also find themselves at the forefront

of the postcolonial critiques and have been confined to the same colonial maps. But maps, the
ones in the colonial and modern epoch, ‘start with abstractions, and fit the “territory” into a
numerical or conceptual grid’.112 The colonies in postcolonial revisions did not exceed colonial
maps and it did not rethink the notion of geographical space nor decolonial place. A
philosophical place is made and does not exist on its own, rather ‘it emerges from the milieus
that act and interact.’113 The latter stems from the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion on geophilosophy
and explains how milieus eventually become territory. It pushed forward the observation on
how Western philosophy is essentially the creation of new concepts rather than the reflection
on thoughts and how, then, a concept is a method of organizing the havoc.114 In critical theory,
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this

Deleuzo-Guattarian

inventory

also

brought

to

light

“deterritorialization”.

Deterritorialization occurs when native people are separated from their cultural, political and
social lineages either through physically removing the population from the land or by forcefully
replacing these lineages with another; a ‘Western other’ to be specific. The legal system
deterritorialized the entire social, political and cultural landscape in the colonies and

reconfigured it to the Western trump card of “civilization” and colonial modernity. But did
deterritorialization’s counterpart, being reterritorialization, in effect manifest in decolonial
scholarship and thus, reoriented the modern/colonial trajectory of the legal order that uprooted
the East? The reterritorialization of the legal topography would require an adjustment and
reconceptualization of ordinary Eurocentric notions on spatialities and dialectical ontologies.
In this then ‘reterritorialized space’ there is no margin for repetition of Western epistemologies
or rethorics because the milieu is becoming. In becoming it ‘[is] constantly shifting, while

territories are more bounded’.115 Jurisprudence created territories, or imagined geographies,
and since postcolonial theory adopted the latter spatial notion, it did not reterritorialize the
terrain. The fictional territories of ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’ did not and do not exist; but rather the
colonial milieu created the territory of the West and non-West that acted and interacted with
the legal framework. These imagined geographies function as analytical categories to the
imaginative legal dialectics that have at the same time become the literal embodiment of the
praxis of colonial and imperial interventions in the Global South. The heritage that came from

these places left a deep mark on how we perceptually and intellectually experience the world
around us today. Genealogies, categories, terms and ideologies developed during and after
colonial reign have been largely adopted and subsequently naturalized in postcolonial theory
alike. In this manner, the West appeared outside of the territorial location of the West by the
deterritorialization of the colonies and materialized as a metropol of colonial conquest in the
East. So, where was the West, then, really located during and after territorial and legal
colonization? The repetition of legal practices from the first encumbering of international law
until now created the territory, space and place for law to reside globally. The apostropic
impasse mushroomed the legal ethnography of modern colonial maps, but these maps
115
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themselves are abstract.116 This abstraction deterritorialized lifewords in the form of the hyper
impersonalized and hyper abstracted proletariat of legal state personalities. In this sense, ‘the
abstract categories come first—lines of longitude and latitude, scales and conventions. Into
these abstractions the earth fits. The earth is governed by the [legal] abstractions.’117 In the
legalized abstractions the legacies of dead European colonial thinkers are still very much alive

to this day; they are continuously becoming. Regardless whether we refute them or not, their
intellectual tradition is not buried under the sand of places they originated from nor did they
disappear with the winds of time that have long surpassed their final breaths. We did not
historicize them nor do we collect their philosophies from dusty archives, but rather their
theories remain at the forefront of the postmodern legal fortress. By asserting a certain
postcolonial claim to history or giving value to empirical realities and categories of colonial
difference their thoughts proliferate the “mythical European figure” 118 . In this fashion,

revisionist postcolonial historiography eventually becomes a ‘variation of the same basic
form’.119 The ideas of Europe and its thinkers are an undeniable hegemon in legal historical
discourse. However, their false universalizing omnipotence will continue to resurface if
postcolonial historiography outlines Europe by default as the central point of reference and the
literatim beginning of history. Revisionist historicity is ‘what made modernity or capitalism look
not simply global but rather as something that became global over time, by originating in one
place (Europe) and then spreading outside. This “first Europe, then elsewhere” structure of

global historical time was historicists; different non-Western nationalisms would later produce
local versions of the same narrative, replacing “Europe” by some locally constructed center’120.
If postcolonial historiography mimics local versions of European history it is not decolonial. It
is not only not decolonial, but it also colonizes other possibilities in the same manner as the
empires. Europe has always defined itself through opposition to or against those localities,
times and human lineages that it deemed ‘non-European’. It relies on others to be European, or
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more precisely, to be non-European without which they have no identity. The non-European is
forever becoming European and shall, in the end, not transition into being. If it were to be
European, the European would cease to exist and Europe would lose its hegemonic grip on
power. Europe, moreover, did not stay enclosed within its own blurry geographical location nor
has it become a past phenomena; it is continuously resurrected by its allies and enemies of

which the gradual adaptation of fabricated notions on ‘time’ and ‘space’ of early and postmodern
Europe is an integral part. Both have equally reassured the ever-becoming (universal) presence
of coloniality in today’s polycentric world. Europe was never alive, but somehow its ideas never
died. It has traveled over time and space and it is now located in numerous geographical
provinces beyond the actual European continent. We find Europe in the Global South and the
Global South in Europe. After the formal end of colonialism and the acquisition of Third World
sovereignty came the post-mortem absorption of “pre-existing [non-European] histories that

were singular and unique, [into the] histories [of] the multiple pasts of Europe”. 121 The
continuous revival of Europe has placed former-colonies in an ontological continuum of
coloniality. In the sense that those in the Third World are ‘infinitely becoming’ and are never
truly allowed ‘to be’ as they are trapped in this “waiting room of humanity”.122 The majority of
the world’s population still awaits their transition into the recognition of their humanity since
the beginning of the civilizing mission that justified brutal colonialism. After that came the
forced adoption of Western political, judicial and economic systems as peoples awaited their

application to enter into the modern sphere. It was democratization, global capitalism,
emancipation, progress, development, technological advancement or any other arbitrary
colonial dialectic that moves non-European geographies as well as postcolonial theories ‘forever
at the edge of Western thought, defining its territory by that already claimed’.123 Colonial Europe
as an imagined geography has ‘historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemical
argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world’124
to the extent that non-European imagined geographies became ‘a category that enters Western
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knowledge and imagination, first of all, as ‘‘an absent object,’’125 set always in relation to the full
presence of the West.’126 The colonized geographies were for the imperial powers a bundle of
“empty” places that could not only be wiped off the map, but also seemed to appear to them as
lacking any substantive or valuable historical narrative of their own prior to imperialism and
colonization. The Global South, moreover became the place on the map where history was

created, Europe’s larger ideology was conceptualized and international law was given birth.127
In other words, the Global South has been submerged with the colonial hypothesis that early
Europeans gave the Global South its (legal) history. Anghie’s text, moreover, does not represent
the legal history of the Global South itself, but rather depicts only the history that Europe made
for the people in the Global South. While Anghie sheds an alternative light onto Europe’s own
version of its legal history, it does also still compose history situated in and around the Western
paradigm. In this sense, it continued to furnish the room for the Europeans with history that

hold the power to write history for the people without as the latter ‘were located in a time ‘before’
the ‘present’’.128 If the contemporary decolonial legal historian does not discover alternatives
that break ties with colonial epistemologies on “time” and “space”, the people affected by
coloniality at present will continue to be trapped in the past. As Walter Mignolo (2000) points
out, ‘the colonial difference in the sixteenth century was located in space. Towards the end of
the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, the measuring stick was history.’129
Challenging the heterogeneity of legal power that produces certain colonial relationships

through the embodiment of historical geography and linear time, should be done with
situatedness and not indicate the zero dimensionality of normative descriptions of temporality
and space. Decolonial legal theory is going in circles since its primary position of critique has
simultaneously become contradictory. For the most part Europe is only given objective reality
when it is defined by its antithesis; the non-Europe(an); the postcolonial; the Third World; etc.
Anghie’s postcolonial narrative centralizes not only Europe’s universal historicity, but in
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addition also empowers its underlying conventional binaries and antithesis, such as; Global
South/Global

North;

self-governance/Mandate

Systems;

colonial/decolonial;

universal/particular; past/future; nation-state/terra nullius, etc. The use of the opposite
spectrum of binary borders (colonial/decolonial) no longer challenges the colonial spiral and is
bound to return to the colonial origin of historicity in full glory. Revisionist accounts of legal

history are an internal part of a colonial hermeneutic spiral, 130 meaning that decolonial
revisions of history do not postulate the colonial narration but rather are mediated by it.131 The
binaries in the colonial hermeneutic spiral all became one of the same as it does not dissolve its
binary antagonism. In the same line of thinking, Frantz Fanon opposed his forced subjectivity
and classification of that of ‘a Black man’. As he argued that this subjectivity is already
predefined by the opposite category of whiteness and, Blackness, therefore, can only mirror
whiteness and is a mere reflection thereof. This keeps the construct of whiteness and the

underlying racial segregation alive; it is caught in the anthropology of becoming. In contrast,
decolonial relations that move beyond binaries which create classifications of historical
difference and empirical categories are not spoken in binaries; such as Black/white,
colonial/decolonial, Global North/Global South, history/future, and-so-forth. The production of
binaries in quantitative measures in time and space have, moreover, redrawn the territory of
legal subjects and their subsequent colonial relationships. Coloniality is not shaken if the origins
of law are analyzed on the Western linear scale of history. It merely buys into the notion that

colonialism was a bad interlude in the past, but that it ‘has long since been overcome by the
heroic initiatives of decolonization in the emergence of colonial societies as independent,
sovereign states’.132 Coloniality, however, is not a social strain that can be restored by the mere
passage of historical time nor by the liberal myth of moral progression. Historicizing the law’s
origins in retrospect on the linear scale of history intrinsically assumes ‘that ideas such as
chronology, temporal progression, and pastness must be human universals’. The latter does not
devalorize the centrality of the European narrative.133 Any iteration of such decolonial lexica is
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entrenching histories of colonized peoples in the same manner as legal positivists. It, in
addition, also moves postcolonial historiography into a version of legal history that is European
at its core. In order to be able to inhabit decolonial hybridity as de-spatialized and detemporalized subjects, decolonial legal theory is in need of finding methods that move in
between rather than at the edges. Homi K. Bhabha (1994) developed the post-colonial concept

of ‘in betweenness’ as a decolonial space that allows us to escape the impasse of binary
structures, not by complicating both or one side, but rather by opting for a continuous fluxposition of transition ‘in between’ colonial dichotomies. The apostrophe that legal decolonial
coloniality has added, then, could become a valuable symbol of openness; signifying the
contraction between the realities of binaries without becoming an integral part of it. It does not
adopt specific opposition to one modern binary and it refuses the production of another
hyphenated antithetical identity or submerge in a postmodern category of historical difference.

The apostrophe as a symbol of in betweenness is not based on the ontological situatedness that
seeks to abolish Western discourse or substitute it with a form of subalternity but it, instead,
transcends the boundaries of colonial existence that cannot be expressed or arbitrated by a
struggle for one truth, one history or one universal. The suspension of the tension of moving to
antagonistic boundaries such as time/timelessness; space/spacelessness; colonizer/colonized;
etcetera; disappears through the emergence of an in-between discourse of embracing the
unregulated structure of becoming in a decolonial manner. The becoming can also signify a

decolonial discourse of hybrid subjects that break through legal methodical binarism. The
anthropology of becoming cannot be overcome by Man, but the dominant presence of its
Western-centric colonial interpretation thereof can be elevated and disrupted. Symbolisms
such as the decolonial apostrophe are then, as found, by Bhangra ‘valuable as conduits of
understanding’ the materialities of our lifeworlds while also imagining the potential for an
otherwise. However, such symbols as conduit of understanding are

‘also limited, static

representations [that are] not easily communicable across experiences in time or space’.134 The
value of the decolonial apostrophe may, however, ‘be found in the way they provide continuity
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in time and help justify specific forms of managing space, that is, [because] they meld the
temporal and spatial dimensions of human political existence’.135 It is, thus, vital to unsettle the
ordinary modern colonial temporal and spatial epistemologies without resorting to doctrinal
belief-systems and domesticating legal subjects back into the timeline of postmodernity. The
absolute hostility found in legal polarities is no longer able to create subjects if decolonial

methodologies generate ways of being in an ambivalent space and time through the synthesis
of theoretical modalities and praxis.
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CHAPTER
THREE
THE SPACES ‘IN BETWEEN’ THE LAW
Public international law has not failed to engage seriously with the critique of the Third World,

it simply did not have to. The production of postcolonial knowledge spread amongst the
epistemic line of global linear thinking and the theoretical origins of jurisprudence. It espoused
a similar modern strategy grounded in institutionalization of what was primarily a disruptive
anticolonial on-ground praxis. The mimicking of the coloniality of becoming accumulated legal
“decolonial” phenomenologies, hermeneutics and/or theories of Western knowledge, as
opposed to the burning of law books and rethinking the scripts of storytelling beyond ink on
pages. But how does the critical notion of the apostrophic impasse cumulate postcolonial legal

scholarship? Did it intend to minimize the social effect and function of the postcolonial legal
tradition and the broader work of TWAIL? The latter question should be answered in the
negative, while the first question will receive a response in this section. If the purpose of
revisionist historiography is to unveil the colonial formation of jurisprudence to understand the
mutation of modern dialectic and the logic of coloniality for the orientation of decolonial legal
work, it is only fair to ask whether this in effect is useful, and if so, to what extent. While
decoloniality is not a discipline, study or universal theory, this does not mean that academia can
cede itself of any responsibility to enact it or that there is only a praxis possible outside of the
theoretical field.136 That being said, critical lawyers have developed a complex relationship with
liberal humanism along the epistemic lines of academia and it leaves one to wonder what
precisely was achieved on a decolonial level.137 In the same manner as the inherent distinction

between decolonial thinking and doing, I would in this section opt for the partition of the
affluences of postcolonial and decolonial legal scholarship on two levels; the sociology of the
legal profession (Part I) and legal knowledge production (Part II).
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PART I. LEGAL UTOPIAS: THE SOCIAL PRAXIS OF THE LAWYER
International law is the language of the elite. It is haunted by the colonial pens of the past which
smeared the pages with blood and ink, but we still revere them. Law presents itself as a text
written in an unfathomable aristocratic glossary that compels the peasant from decoding any of

its pamphlets that made law the Gods on earth. Punishment, forgiveness, justice, death, life,
property, wealth, love and freedom are all distributed or withheld to mankind by the Gods of
jurisprudence. The Scripture of Law is written in the scholarly lingua franca of medieval Europe
and Cilicia, as the Latin of the Roman Empire echoes through the tongues of the most
distinguished servants, lawyers. While the covenants are administered by the juridical
representatives of the Gods, the chain of legal being does not want to include the ordinary Man
in its process. Holy writs are drafted in legalese and create an aura of daunting intimidation as
one’s faith is dictated in a language that the people do not speak. But then again, the legal class
does not want to speak in the language of the public. They are fluent in the language of the
martinet, the despot, the slavedriver, the oppressor, the colonist, the patriarch and the
bourgeoisie. Their cosmopolitan French and internationalist English also keeps the masses

removed from them, while the commons are made to fatally bow down in front of the bench of
judges. The noble haut monde does not illuminate the plebeians on how to master their speech
or comprehend their legal Gospel, but they are just to worship it. The pious devotees religiously
drawn to the Message of the Gods of jurisprudence, are allowed into academia where legal
theology is taught to enlighten their perishable souls. Only the God-fearing faithful few make it
to the scholarly rank of archbishops and cardinals embarking on the academic path to devote
their lives to research into religious beliefs, behaviors, and institutions, while the rest are sent

out to preach to the people as simple pastors and priests. But in the dungeons of academia, a
network of current and former priests, sisters and cardinals arose who answered to another
prophetic calling; setting fire to the lies and evils of the Church of Law from the thrones of their
ministry.

As critical legal scholars have come together under the ministry of TWAIL to think about,
from and with the Southern hemisphere, this dissertation left me to wonder what distinguishes
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them from the positivist liberal ecclesiastic. If the legal (academic) profession is confined to the
invisible walls of its own institution, is it, then, kosher to ask decolonial legal scholars to raise
the ceilings of the set architecture in international law? The brief answer is no. The longer
answer is also no, but slightly more nuanced. The sociology of the legal profession is, in essence,
a form of legal praxis that is contingent upon legal theory and vice versa. For critical theory, the

absolute distinction between theory and praxis was a Eurocentric attempt of inventing another
dichotomy. Thinking (theory) and doing (praxis) are an interdependent and continuous flow and
in this movement of theory and praxis ‘decoloniality is enacted and, at the same time, rendered
possible. Decoloniality, in this sense, is wrapped up with re-existence; both claim a terrain that
endeavors to delink from the theoretical tenets and conceptual instruments of Western
thought.’138 To incorporate praxis into academia and Western thought not as a separate entity
from theory, a consequence or its opposite is to move away from modern concepts and lines of

thinking.139 Decoloniality is not just theorized, but rather it is also made visible, felt and shown
through praxis. Writing about the theories of scholars such as Antony Anghie is, thus,
insufficient and equally returning to modern deconstructionism. The binary between academy
and praxis not in opposition, but in corporation is a delinking method I desire to reinforce in
this section. To rephrase activist-intellectual Catherine Walsh, writing about the text is not the
same as to think from and within the fights, encounters and struggles it was founded through
and upon. So how, then, can we think from and within the struggles of the post- and decolonial

legal scholar and in particular Antony Anghie? As mentioned in the previous chapters, Anghie
wrote his revisions on the traditional legal history in colonial dialectics. It revealed the lengthy
and deep romance between colonialism and international law, but Anghie simultaneously
espoused the eschatology of liberal progress and modern legalism. But why, from and within
which struggles did he embark on a decolonial-colonial journey? Lawyers, such as Anghie, do
not just think law, they also do law. Doing law is for the majority part a form of strategic
interpretation by stretching the edges of ordinary linguistics in legal materials and non-
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material realities. The maps of conventional legal history were already in place, but they were
read through the lense of positivism. Anghie did not reinvent these maps, but rather
strategically instrumentalized the in-house liberal dialectic to speak to the colonizer in their
own language. The intellectual’s analysis on the enduring legacy of colonialism at the heart of
jurisprudence, sparked a certain discourse within the colonial camp of law. The imperative

adaptation of the Eurocentric approach in Anghie’s text catalyzed postcolonial and decolonial
scholarship into the threshold of legal academia. It caused such chaos that it partially scattered
the traditional gates for subaltern knowledge and critical lawyers of the Global South to break
through the fixed categories of the academic disciplines that intellectuals of a certain ideological
background previously inhabited exclusively. For a brief moment the relationship of the colonial
world and the periphery trembled and the social infrastructure in academia was brought to its
knees to recognize the existence of imaginations of other possibilities, voices and ambitions

within the legal framework. Reading Anghie’s text through the lens of theory conceals a broader
decolonial pedagogy-method that was subtly present. Under the banner of postcolonial
historical revisions critical scholars marched, not coincidentally, and were pushed forward by
virtue of a decolonial pedagogy. The same legal vehicle that had forced the Third World into
illegibility, now ushered in a new period of legal scholarship: the fluid decolonial spheres.
Within these spheres there lies an opportunity to decenter a state-perspective and, instead,
vocalize the encounters of people from the Third World within the legal regime. Unfortunately,

Anghie did not succeed in the former, because ‘for the master’s tools will never dismantle the
master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never
enable us to bring about genuine change’.140 As opposed to thinking from within the logic of
jurisprudence, contemporary critical thinkers force us to be attentive to the ruptures at the
margins and algorithms of life. With the first conference of TWAIL at Harvard Law School,
almost forty years after Bandung, mainstream international law faced a momentum of rupture.
Ruptures in the law alienate us from the idea that the linearity of history is indicative of destiny.
The soil that connected the both is left fractured due the unsettling effects of rupture. The
rupture, then, can be ‘understood as a radical and often forceful form of discontinuity, central
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to current perceptions of a world in turmoil’.141 In ordinary orientation, ruptures appear to us
as negative moments of destruction. They represent the shattering of existing elements and or
conditions, but ‘by the same token it can act as a positive or dynamic impulse towards escape,
redirection, reconstitution and sometimes renewal [and] then, ruptures are moments at which
value emerges through a break with something.’142 TWAIL carved into existence a multiplicity

of ruptures that attempted to escape from the colonial impasse by imploding on the continuity
of legal conventionalism. The force of the multiplicity of legal postcolonial ruptures is found in
the inability to capture TWAIL into one particular strain, as the exact meaning, function or
potence is amorphous and left in the ‘in-between’; i.e. it does not make sense for the orthodox
modern. Whether TWAIL is a methodological approach; an academic collective; a decentralized
social/political movement; a decolonial dream or emancipatory strategy; an intellectual
assemblage; a style of writing or just a theory - its fluidity does not belong to the static and

unchanged traditional order that international law aims to produce. Michael Fakhri observes
that TWAIL is constantly defining and transforming itself, ‘but just as TWAIL itself is made-up
of a multitude of perspectives, the [question on its exact meaning] are answered in a wide array
of styles [...] I have met some people whose scholarship is aligned with TWAIL but vehemently
insist that they are not TWAILers. This suggests that there is some element of being inside and
outside of TWAIL, or some sort of TWAIL sensibility’.143 The decolonial refusal to define itself in
its practices has, in this manner, found an escape route of processual transcendence rather than

transformation. Transcendence as opposed to transformation moves away from ‘thinking about
change as primarily effected through events. To focus on the role of events is to foreground
particular moments when a set of material, social and imaginary ruptures come together and
produce a break in the flow of history – a new truth.’144 The pedagogical praxis of the critical
legal scholar, in this manner, holds the moment to rupture legal colonial temporality. There is
in praxis no exact moment of change or glorious victory after a revolution, because there is no
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global present. Dimitri Papadopoulos (2018) observes that the highlighting of temporal moments
and catapulting it as ‘a moment of change’ is at the expense of the potence of the present that is
made of people’s everyday practices:

‘[These are] the practices employed to navigate daily life and to sustain relations,

the practices which are at the heart of social transformation long before we are
able to name it as such[..] Social transformation is not about cultivating faith in
the change to come, it is about honing our senses so that we can perceive the
processes which create change in ordinary life. Social transformation is not about
reason and belief, it is about perception and hope. It is not about the production
of subjects, but about the making of life. It is not about subjectivity, it is about
experience.’145

The seemingly insignificant praxis or the entire pedagogy behind legal decolonial work
altogether, thus, form a network of relationships that do not necessarily refer to a grand
momentum of ‘change’. But they do bring about a different temporality and perception of what
transition entails. How do we read temporality when the international law moves and when
people move? What is the difference in rhythm and how is the everyday under the legal system
more than just being forced into subjectivity or coloniality? What is this transitional time of

decolonial legal pedagogy? The decolonial legal language of transition can rupture the ways in
which we perceive change rather than focussing on what it signifies for the system of
international law and for people as a subject of law. In the law’s attempt to confine people in a
global horizontal space of control and indifferent temporality, the naming of the colonial
elements in law confines subjects in this spatio-temporal realm. But the decolonial legal
academic carries with him new forged identities and old identities, old and new struggles as
well as forms of sociability that do not fit in this framework. If all that this dissertation could
establish is deconstructing how Anghie expressed himself in colonial dialectics from a
theoretical perspective, it would equally be a modern exercise as it ignores the possibility of a
145
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decolonial pedagogical praxis. The ‘painful process of strategic and tactical refinement whose
defeats and reversals are as pronounced as its victories and advances’ comes to surface through
the pedagogy.146 But at this moment, the movement of Third World Approaches to International
Law has placed itself in the whirlwind of clashing objection, opposition and orthodox resistance.
At the intersection of the decolonial legal movement and traditional international law, questions

arose as to which legal principles to preserve and which legal methods to reject. The decolonial
desire to move instead of merely to move forward, can be alleviated from underneath the linear,
progressive elements in Anghie’s text. But ‘as a boomerang effect of the poststructural politics
of difference, much is missed’ if we do not alleviate these pedagogies from underneath, and
instead ‘return swing toward the universal’ in legal theories.147 The renewed unification of the
jurists in the Global South, after Bandung, together with critical lawyers from the North cut deep
into the traditional North-South divide and old colonial maps of division. The doing of the

postcolonial version of international law confronted the traditional lawyer with its own
historical baggage through his own speech. The efforts of Anghie and other postcolonial
scholars, in this manner, caused multiple ruptures in the legal theoretical hegemon.
Decolonization as a historical emergence rather than a specific period in time is also
continuously becoming and thus an ongoing process. Allowing the pedagogy to ‘embrace aIl the
elements and forms of expression of this totality within us’, which means including Western
thought, transcends rather than dismantles Western ideas.148 Transcending Western hegemony

as opposed to creating another paradigmatic strategy, that is still epistemologically centered in
the colonial continuum of international law, requires a pedagogy of re-imagining. To transcend,
for example, also means that this dissertation criticizes but not dismisses the postcolonial
historiography of Antony Anghie. There is an element of dismantling present when it comes to
the supposed universality of Western thought and the absolute dominance in its knowledge
production, but transcending does not intend to create another universal nor exclusionary
classical order. The refusal to be subjugated in the globality of Western thought, does not mean
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that there is exclusively a place for subaltern ways of thinking nor does it mean that we
continually generate and regenerate knowledge and theory from either one exclusively. Sylvia
Wynter dismantled the invention of Man1 during the Renaissance and followed its anthropology
of becoming into Man2 in the the Age of Reason in response to the colonial and the posthuman
thereafter.149 Wynter was occupied with challenging the universality of Western philosophy and

genealogy on what it means to be human and when Man comes to stand as human. Wynter, as
an embodiment theorist, is simultaneously occupied with praxis on how the body lives and feels
outside of these theoretical conceptions. Bodies dwell in particular kinds of work and to be
human is also about the praxis of living and the embodiment of this weight. This counternarrative is not necessarily grounded in dualistic conceptualization thinking and doing or
absolute truths. It rather has problematized the initial separation of praxis and theory as the
Man/human is more complex as well as the existence of one truth. It is the understanding that

discursive reforms that solely dismantle other knowledges go hand-in-hand with institution
building. The building of institutions situated in a particular form of thinking and the
production of knowledge, is also concerned with ‘sorting’ authentic knowledge (Part II). It is the
institutionalization of knowledge that not only produces praxis, but also creates universal and
hegemonic narratives; an epistemology of the modern. Decolonial dismantling, in contrast, is
placing aside the universalized, absolute grammars of legal violence and figuring out what then
remains. It is deciding what the difference is between the enunciation and proclamation of

Western jurisprudence. The human embodiment in praxis that cannot be fully institutionalized
and the non-eternity of the enunciation, forges on relations of the narratives instead of
focussing on its sorting capacity. It is pedagogical legal praxis, rather than legal theory, that
‘enables us to transcend the linear precepts, binary-based suppositions, and outcome-oriented
views of Western knowledge, research, and thought. It helps us think from and with the ongoing
processes of decolonial shift and movement rather than simply with and from decoloniality as
paradigm, consequence, and position. And it helps give presence to relation [..] of actionreflection-action, but also of present-past; the (co)relationality that grounds (ancestral) non-
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Western knowledges, worldviews, and life practices, and that orients a perspective prospect,
and proposition of struggle for a different model of life, living, knowing, and being in and with
the world.’ 150 The decolonial legal pedagogy of oppositional consciousness to traditional
jurisprudence should be precisely concerned with consciousness rather than responsiveness to
manifested legal discourse. It follows then that doing law and thinking law are both needed to

decolonize knowledge and the being of law and Man in the anthropology of becoming. The legal
pedagogy should be concerned with ‘knowing and becoming what [legal] coloniality of
knowledge and [legal] being prevented to know and become’. 151 This is, in essence, the
elementary task of any decolonial occupation in which the praxis of decolonization is not
regulated by the state or has returned to the state’s system of international law in its decolonial
analysis. There is certainly no praxis of decoloniality in enabling Western thought,
epistemologies and ontologies to reign in a decolonial legal praxis or theory, as it did in Anghie’s

text. How is international law “decolonized” if we do not question the knowing that gave rise to
the epistemic assumptions on which the architecture of international law was grounded, but
merely illustrate the doing? If we only question the doing of the sovereignty doctrine, which was
the exclusion of the Third World from the legal realm, and bring its origins back through
something as the “dynamic of difference” throughout different colonial eras, it carries the risk
that the colonial continuum itself is not questioned. The premise at the heart of decolonial
knowing and doing, is not just questioning the legal principles of state-hood which prevent

Palestinians to become a subject of international law with all the rights and obligations. It is not
just illustrating how the exclusion of non-European people was based on the exclusion from
sovereignty and the racist European ontologies. Rather it is also questioning the very
groundwork of European epistemologies and ontologies outside of law upon which
international law is built. It is questioning the philosophical groundwork that does not seem
‘legal’ at first glance, such as temporality and spatiality. It is being sensitive to this underlying
disciplinary network of knowledges in a decolonial pedagogical praxis, that praxis also becomes
theoretical and the theoretical also becomes practical. It begins by questioning what the ‘doing
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of thinking law’ and the ‘thinking of doing law’ entails for the praxis, theory and our
understanding of the legal order. International law is only continuously becoming because it
has become a discourse embedded in and limited to certain technicalities within its scope. The
subjects of law are forced into tangible historical and colonial realities, while the traditional
jurist attempts to conceal not only these realities but also the imagination thereof. It is the

decolonial legal scholar who tries to enforce attentiveness to the realities, imaginations and
mingles in between both. The decolonial appeal was not an appeal to the Westphalian state
system nor to the framework of law, but rather it was an attempt to appeal to the human beingbecoming, to the human thinking-doing and doing-thinking. These efforts of decolonial
scholarship hold the power to challenge Western thought as it undoes the logic of theory
prevailing over praxis.

When the material escape to the impasse of the colonial continuum seems rather
impossible, it is an imaginative desire that forges other possibilities under the grip of
international law. International law does in reality not exist, it is nothing but an abstract
imagination of the West. Colonialism was once a fantasy of the empires yearning for global
hegemony or it was maybe even a dream of vicious colonizers that turned into the lived
nightmare of others. It is exactly the strong desires of a certain imagination that hold the power
to create material worlds. Decolonial pedagogy holds the same force as it is as much as a desire

and imagination that creates a utopic horizon in which imperceptible minds long and dwell until
tangible bodies follow. Our bodies, however, have become estranged to us as a mechanism of
societal discipline took fictional ownership over it. The fictional ownership over our bodies is
reinstated if the body becomes a mere carrier of a biological vessel, a physicality, a means of
division, separation and alienation from desire and imagination. The human body is then
constructed into something so metaphysical that it could be universalized as if it is a thing
capable of enduring such violent theoretical assimilation. But the body is a dialogical production
of encounters with texts as ‘bodies materialize in a complex set of temporal and spatial relations
to other bodies’.152 Decolonial praxis is not about state-practice or theory, but it is a register of
152
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imagination and the real at the same time. The relationship of TWAIL to international law
cannot be defined or infused in an institutional register, but only imagined and felt in the mind
of the individual. It is the imagination of a certain desire that cannot be captured in time or
locked up in space, because it has an imperceptible ambiance to it. It is the questioning of how
to decolonize thinking and doing of law, not saying how exactly or ‘what it is, or what ought to be,

but to provoke thought; one that requires no other verification than the way in which it is able
to “slow down” reasoning and create an opportunity to arouse a slightly different awareness of
the problems and situations mobilizing us’.153 Not describing merely the realities of traditional
international law allows us to slow down, see, smell and feel in slowness, instead of rushing to
the end of the Real lifeworld, only to triple halfway. Such decolonial slowness ‘represents an
optimum. Its results are unpredictable, but the beginnings of the capacity to endure are
detectible, coming where formerly there [was] classicism. It is no longer through deepening li

tradition but through the tendency of aIl traditions to enter into relation that this is achieved.’154
Imagining a decolonial utopia means an equilibrium of an unfinished slow process of doing and
thinking. The legal decolonial utopia exists in the minds of scholars alone as it has not, nor do I
expect it ever will, manifested. But it has produced utopian praxis that animated the dreams of
other possibilities. The distributive consequences of the decolonial pedagogies in the sociology
of the legal profession only hold meaning in concrete situations where practitioners operate
from a decolonial bubble. Decolonial legal praxis are not Gods that prevent TWAIL servants from

becoming generalizing theoreticians occupied with “applying” their theories or capturing
subjects with their praxis as an assertion of the correctness of their theory. There are no
heavenly guarantees that they will not subside to liberal humanism or the “justice” framework
of international law, because it is, to them, the second-best option to complete surrendering to
an all-absorbing colonial continuum. But the question then, is not what and who the decolonial
legal scholar included in his approach, but rather what and who he excluded. It is then only fair
to conclude that the liberal conversion of such scholars is indicative of that they were only
religious by name and that post colonial legal scholarship is a facade for them to disguise that
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there is no decolonial alternative for international law. The conventional reading of the
apostrophic impasse that does not make sense, remained for them the leading canon.

PART II. THE DYSTOPIAN PRODUCTION OF POSTCOLONIAL LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

The legal text has a hierarchical relation to the script of the subtext; its writing organizes and
archives subjects of the law in its institutional register. After the formal independence of the
Third World, the modern became increasingly more occupied with particular forms of
knowledge, logic and Renaissance-imbued reasoning in writing that produces a temporal
distinction. Temporal distinctions continue to be ‘the physical as well as imaginary location
where the coloniality of power is at work in the confrontation of two kinds of local histories
displayed in different spaces and times across the plane’.155 The accumulation of capital through
the plunder, dispossession and exploitation in the colonies placed the West in an hegemonic
position to produce subjects and determine what became precious, particular and empirically
different. The forced scriptualization of oral traditions, production of “new” cultures and
demolition of subaltern knowledge was one of the consequences of colonial re-cataloguing.156

Knowledge as a tool of subjugation and rendering former colonies discursively invisible and
unreadable has been an occupation of the modern since the beginning of colonization until
today. Coloniality is moved by particular logics of archiving such as through Kantian reason,
education and writing.157 The stories of international law are literacy programs at the heart of
the New World that had the objective of re-educating the illiterate “uncivilized” nations in the
Global South. The linguistics of knowledge and colonial locus of enunciation hold the power to
reshape the lifeworlds in the pheriperies by the subversion of fluent subaltern wisdom into

traditional jurisprudence. It was precisely the stories of the subaltern that the colonial jurist did
not speak, because it was not spoken in exclusionary binaries, but rather embodied a certain
155

Walter D. Mignolo Supra note 7. At ix-x.
See also Walter Mignolo, THE DARKER SIDE OF THE RENAISSANCE: LITERACY, TERRITORIALITY &
COLONIZATION (2003); Sergio Holas, Postmodernity, Subalternity and Border Gnosis, 3 Postcolonial Studies 5
(2002); Édouard Glissant Supra note 145; Gerald Roche, Articulating language oppression: colonialism, coloniality
and the erasure of Tibet’s minority languages, 5 Patterns of Prejudice 53 (2019); Bill Ashcroft et al.,
POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES AND KEY CONCEPTS (2013), 283.
157 Walter D. Mignolo & Catherine E. Walsh Supra note 22. At 247-256.
156

71

level of fluidity that could not establish Western superiority through invented legal identities of
difference. International law created the conditions for the modern manuscript of colonial
difference and fractured opposition to hegemonic colonial discourses, amongst which the
postcolonial legal vocabulary. The overarching legal dossiers spread amongst the occidental line
of the West into ‘[the] border epistemologies emerging from the wounds of colonial histories,

memories, and experiences’.158 Critical scholars have revised older dialectics of resistance and
Mignolo (2003) in particular notices that ‘at the end of the twentieth century, border thinking
can no longer be controlled and it offers new critical horizons to the limitations of critical
discourses within hegemonic cosmologies (such as Marxism, deconstruction, world system
analysis, or postmodern theories)’. 159 The traces of border thinking can be found in Gloria
Anzaldúa’s “Border Theory”, which is situated in alternative epistemological traditions living at
the edges of the borders of the colonial matrix of power. 160 Borderlands/La frontera (1987)

breathed life into border gnosis and border thinking that attempted to move beyond the
linearity of modern knowledge with a dwelling perspective and lived subaltern dimensions,
because alternatives ‘cannot be perceived and theorized from a perspective inside modernity
itself’.161 Since the postcolonial legal narrative was incorporated into the progress story of public
law, it does not disrupt the theoretical borders of the modern frontiers of knowledge and
knowledge production in legal academia. The universality of jurisprudence is based on the myth
that it is the only true knowledge. This authoritative exclusivity given to legal science dominates

over all times in which other forms of knowledge across the globe emerged. The intellectual
fortress of European civilization forged the legal discipline into a privileged subject of history,
archive of the present and future academy of prosperity, humanity and above all justice. Critical
legal pedagogies are built upon the reinhabitation of international law and the legal
epistemology by the Third World, albeit with a different dogmatic approach. The Manifesto of
Third World Approaches to International Law explains how international law became the
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primary language ‘in which domination is coming to be expressed in the era of globalization’
and how it ‘displaced national legal systems in their importance’.162 But the TWAIL Manifesto
also found itself convinced that legal projects, such as the field of human rights, are ‘manipulated
to further and legitimize neo-liberal goals’163 and that international law today ‘deliberately ignore
the phenomena of uneven development in favor of prescribing uniform global standards’.164

International law and its different sub-fields are not ‘manipulated’ to substantiate neo-liberal
goals, they are protagonists of the neo-liberal. At least, according to the academic texts of most
TWAIL scholars themselves, including the historical revision of Antony Anghie. To say that
international law is being ‘manipulated’ or that it ‘deliberately ignores’ hovering inequality is a
humanist liberal statement. In essence, the Manifesto pretends to be oblivious to the colonial
origin of the discipline and the historical trajectory from colonialism into the different spheres
and technologies of modernity, such as neoliberalism, and to the the essential function of legal

internationalism as a powerful difference producing mechanism. It,

instead, places an

accentpdfuation on present-day jurisprudence as if it shockingly found contemporary
international law hijacked by modern ideologies and instruments of the New World Order.
While the body of writing might have attempted to provide a new critical context for discourse
on the legal epistemology of modernity in wake of a rising global culture, altering ties in
geopolitical state-craft, rearrangement of world economies or ‘the obliteration of state
sovereignty in a world marked by fluidity and border-crossing’,165 it erased its own canon of

postcolonial historical consciousness entirely. As pointed out in the previous chapters, the
scholarly pantheon of the Third World borrowed heavily from the Eurocentric philosophies and
epistemologies, but a presumed decolonial approach that ‘regard the postcolonial as an epoch
or age [instead] as a particular mode of historical emergence’ is nothing short of a victory for
hegemonic Western knowledge production. 166 If the assemblage of TWAIL scholars, then,
amplifies the necessity for empirical research and intellectual organization to combat this
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sudden thunderbolt of the modern legal state-apparatus, it fails to consider that theoretical
expansion with origins in colonial knowledge leads to the reinforcement of Western intellectual
frontiers at the expense of a possibility to develop alternative modes of ‘being in between’.
Disordering the logic of modernity also means disordering the logic in academia, instead of
widening the application of decolonization as a metaphor. ‘When metaphor invades

decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles
theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and
decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even
if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks’.167 Prominent
TWAIL scholar and founding member B.S. Chimni admits that the critique of TWAIL was an
ineffective method to disrupt neoliberal law or reshape the overall legal framework, but he
claimed that this inability was mainly due to the ‘ideological domination of Northern academic

institutions, the handful of critical third world international law scholars, the problems of doing
research in the poor world, and the fragmentation of international legal studies’.168 I do not
dispute or intend to minimize the colossal modern/colonial obstacles with which TWAIL
scholars are continuously met nor do I think that any story would be dark enough to fill it with
an exhaustive list of the impediments and violence that comes from (critiquing) the legal
hegemon. However, the ineffectiveness of TWAIL is not due to external barriers alone, but also
due to the adoption of the ontologies, knowledge, framework and/or conceptualizations that

emerged out of the legal colonial context in which they were generated (Chapter 1; Chapter 2).
The hazard that a regime with colonial origins and modern futures would, moreover,
accommodate the postcolonial dream, is raising fairytales. The legal integration of decoloniality
would virtually result in the end of the ever-becoming, unfinished order of international law.
Given the muscular critique of decolonial legal theory, a genuine belief in a “happily ever after”
of legal coloniality by TWAIL scholars seems unlikely. A virtuous attitude, such as a Bandung
spirited ‘high hope’, is needed to direct agency in transitional moments. But at the same time,
the postcolonial legal scholar has also become a paddock of knowledge production who became
167
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‘entangled in a web of textual [and] conceptual conventions that re-formulate’ the narratives of
classes of historical difference that are not necessarily an adequate description of complex
subjectivities and pluriverse effects of law.169 Postcolonial legal scholarship places emphasis on
empirical research and theory, while there is an imminent Lancanian disconnect between the
life of legal subjects that is theorized and the everydayness of those dwelling under the legal

regime. TWAIL endorses the category of the Third World to ensure that the plurality of
resistance practices coming from transregional groupings and identities become a viable
unified collective of opposition against the Western regime of law.170 But this also launches the
Third World as the primary object of theoretical inquiries as if it were an unchanging monolithic
category. Physical, spatial or physic spaces will, in the end, homogenize the distinctive
encounters with the legal system as well as homogenize the plurality of resistance.171 There is
an expectation, or at least hope, that it is possible to unify against the hegemon in the Northern

sphere without synthesizing each other’s experiences, frames, methods, and theoretical
assumptions. This epistemological approach sets forward phenomenological and ethnographic
pathways to modernity because there are implicit social and culturally bound versions and ideas
on the dialectics of resistance. The postcolonial legal knowledge production with the Third
World as its object-position, moreover, leads to a fetishization of the East and positive
mystification of “others” that cannot let all locals speak for themselves. 172 When highly
theorized, ‘cross-cultural knowledge does not have conditions distinct from the conditions of

knowledge

in

general

and,

further,

cross-cultural

epistemology

is

not

possible

epistemologically, except in so far as it stands on the perception of otherness both radical and
virtual’ which renders it undesirable.173 Countering the colonial legal system with a decolonial
legal system does, moreover, not prevent decolonial theory grounded in subaltern or alternative
knowledge to be enacted by the actors of international law with different purposes.174 So far, the
liberal conversion of postcolonial legal history and other critical notions in the juridical
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progress narrative were used to justify the further expansion of “new” laws and institutions that
tormented the Global South with an even more tighter legal deadlock than before. Progressivist
conceptions of history were ‘insensitive to the material force, indeed to the ontological weight,
of matters of the cultural and national, in the broad sense, matters “impervious to theoretical
debunking”’.175 The main force of legal colonial modernity is that of the absolute reliance on

institutionalized reasoning and the exclusive authenticity awarded to Western routes of
knowing and understanding. The violence of the ‘authentic’ epistemic knowledge built the
foundations of the science of modern day jurisprudence in search of ‘truths’ in its own backyard.
The intellectual legal project recounts the story of the surge of one particular knowledge given
the universal primacy to produce and be crowned into a discipline, while empirically different
or antithetical forms of knowing and understanding had to be captured in order to be erased or
complement Western thought later on. The tropes of postcolonial thinking complemented the

theology of progress and became part of ‘[a] universal repertoire that is inescapable, a repertoire
which, though of Western origin, has in the past century and a half become a universal
patrimony beyond which political and social thought is inconceivable except very marginally’.176
Aziz Al-Azmeh finds that this repertoire of modernity ensured that a fethishism of education
and the legal system became part of the modern social imaginary and semi-permanently
acquired a position of cultural and intellectual supremacy. The impossibility of absolute
knowledge is in effect ‘a nihilistic epistemology [based on the] assumption that knowledge of

others is rendered radically questionable and confined to a self-expressive intuitionism, indeed,
a solipsism, and the use of molluscar notions such as “cultural ontologies”.177 Other forms of
knowledge are captured by a certain temporality that places them in the past of inauthenticity.
But has postcolonial legal scholarship pushed the borders of the legal academies? It has with
success questioned and toppled the authenticity of traditional legal stories. Critical decolonial
texts have unpacked the colonial legacies of international law in detail, confronted the double
standard of legal principles in the North-South divide, centered the peripheries in the stories
of international law, and-so-forth. But it has remained in all these efforts in tête-à-tête with
175
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the liberal modern Man, instead of striking up subaltern conversations. Was there, however, a
genuine theoretical alternative for scholars such as Anghie?
Border thinking, in contrast with the above, breaks ties with the relationship to the
modern/colonial by not having an ‘outside’ reference as it acknowledges that the beginning of
the modern project is founded upon the violent hegemony of ‘true’ knowledge that in any case
references itself. The lack of an outside reference refers to the disruption of notions of
authenticity that ‘contribute to the suppression of knowledge in the internal and external
frontiers of the modern world system’178. The governing bodies and texts in legal sciences are

collections of Western knowledge and thinking of primarily colonial origin. There is, in reality
however, no such thing as “the state”, “the Resistance” or “authentic knowledge”, but there was
simply a violent force of Western imagination. The stylized form of the authentic story of
international law collapses, when we gain an understanding of how the worlds and peoples are
brought together sharing the same precarities, while living different material lives in the South
and North of the former empires and the colonies alike.179 In an attempt to understand our
precarious state beyond the modern vocabulary of progress, I opt for a different reading of

postcolonial legal history of international law, besides a different form of writing. An alternative
glance over postcolonial legal records can move it beyond the plasticity of the power that the
writer holds. Anghie’s text dealt with a traditional legal vocabulary, a historical artifact in which
the postcolonial revision was squeezed into. The colonial maps of knowledge needed to be
ordered in a certain manner so it could be given names, borders could be delineated and
linguistic regions made legible and illegible. The territorial re-interpretation and reimagination of earlier periods

and notions of

First World/Third World and

Developed/Underdeveloped is not a modern story of Resistance in hindsight of historical
oblivion, the upheaval of colonial wars and displacement of subaltern knowledge. Alternative
reading produces the possibility of ‘leaking’ the ink of the text beyond abstracticalities, borders
and fixed maps. The rhythms of lifeworlds always exceed the textual, the epistemologies and

authentic hermeneutics as these patterns cannot be captured by the pen of history with capital
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179

Walter D. Mignolo & Catherine E. Walsh Supra note 22. At xiv.
See also Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, THE MULTITUDE (2004).

77

‘H’. Understanding universal History and the postcolonial accounts situated in its semantics, is,
then, only understanding hegemony and simultaneously accepting the invitation of the systemic
production of social organization. Border thinking, instead, moves the reader to the margins of
the text and the in between of international law. The apostrophic impasse, then, signifies a
moment that is being described, instead of a desire to continuously move forward after that

moment has passed or reading into the next passage. Rather than focussing on the state”, “the
Resistance” or “authentic knowledge”, we read through a fluid text about the becoming of an
ever changing network of international law in order to disentangle old and new maps. We read
through the apostrophic impasse and complicate the traditional language and authentic
meanings that cannot wed the words of ‘apostrophe’ and ‘impasse’, because in modern
vocabulary it does not make sense. The modern story preys on known forms of Resistance
spoken in the language of the traditional jurist; authentic Resistance. Authentic Resistance

occurs during the artificially orchestrated moment in time in which the postcolonial scholar
prescriptively questioned the plane of international law in the legal mother tongue. It analyzes
relationships between different nation states in line with the framework of international law, but
is oblivious to the relationship within nation states. In other words, it seduces the writer and
reader alike to focus on the social imaginary of the visible maps, borders and locations of
international law, rather than the non-material relationships in between. During colonization,
spaces were not only captured by the colonial powers, there was also a necessity to visibly

capture them under the gaze of the Western empires. Laws, (hi)stories and literal displacement
made colonialism visible and it gave the violence a dimension that it would haunt and live
beyond its time. With that, the absorptive quality of colonial modernity repositioned authentic
Resistance and social justice movements to formulate their struggles in and around the lexicon
of the neoliberal agenda. Writing these struggles into existence in the colonial literary syntax
equated to the assimilation of modernity. For instance, the feminist notions on the exclusion of
women in the agenda of rights and broader field of law, led to many imperial invasions and
occupation of territories on the grounds of legitimate critique. But the relation that a reader has
to the text is not plastic, rather it is consistently in process. In this process the reader constantly
re-situate their relation to the written body of work and the apostrophic impasse, then, becomes
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concerned with the epistemic violence of law in other ways of knowing beyond
traditional/modern knowledge in a multiplicity of ways. As legal violence continues to travel
differently through communities, we do not need to constantly rewrite the narrative and follow
it retrospectively with blank pages in our hands. The becoming of the legal regime and the
colonial continuum is persistently in conversation. The author of this conversation is not one

modern and it does not have one particular geographical location, but it merely had a scribe.
The lifelong state of liminality forces readers to read into postcolonial legal texts a certain
imagination that produces their own forms of desire irrespective of what they materially deliver.
A solution oriented perspective with high roads out of the colonial continuum is a dead end that
entertains modern repetition. The ethnographic sensorium and incompleteness of stories
'occupies its own kind of temporality that un- folds in the present: a dynamic interpenetration
of past and future, actual and virtual. Distinct from potentiality and not reducible to causality

or outcomes, becoming is characterized by the indeterminacies that keep history open, and it
allows us to see what happens in the meantimes of human struggle and daily life.’180 In this
manner, the strangeness surrounding the apostrophic impasse allows readers to become the
interlocutors of postcolonial legal texts and the material realities. The anthropology of
becoming imagines ‘[an] attempt to make real what [people] need and long for. Desire does not
seek a singular, decontextualized object, but a broader world or set of relations in which the
object is embedded and becomes meaningful’.181 The attentiveness of the apostrophic impasse

to the unfinished process of international law can bring to life ‘the conditions of possibility for
moments of surprise and the sustained, open-ended engagements that wonder, itself always
historically and locally situated, precipitate’ by means of empirical postcolonial intervention.182
Academic postcolonial knowledge production and the resort to empirical research, at contrast,
does not hold the power to encrypt the continuous openness of the apostrophe in more sensible
articulation of desires, high hopes and social imaginations of alternative lives on the margins.
The reader cannot ask from the postcolonial legal scholar to move beyond human
exceptionalism, but it can use the text as a force field that engages with different vectors of
180
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powers if the reader takes a dwelling perspective. This is where the Western border drawn
between the academy and practice dissolves and does not become mutually exclusive, but it
rather works together and reinforces the other. It ‘connects and brings together in relation —
as both pluri- and interversals— local histories, subjectivities, knowledges, narratives, and
struggles against the modern/colonial order and for an otherwise.’183
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